As readers of this blog are aware—click here, here, here, and here for related posts—the CPLR 3213 motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint can be a powerful tool to secure an expedited judgment, “meld[ing] pleading and motion practice into one step, allowing a summary judgment motion to be made before
In Castle Restoration & Constr., Inc. v Castle Restoration, LLC, Suffolk County Commercial Division Justice Elizabeth H. Emerson refused to enforce an oral agreement that allegedly modified a prior written agreement between the parties. In this blog post, we see how the Court applied a variety of contractual principals to determine the validity of
It’s not often that a lawsuit in the Commercial Division between sophisticated parties to an arm’s-length business transaction warrants a blistering rebuke of the parties by the Court. But on December 3, 2021, New York County Commercial Division Justice Andrew Borrok issued a scathing decision in a case entitled Extended CHAA Acquisition, LLC v Mahoney
Practitioners often choose to practice in the Commercial Division because of its well-documented efficiencies. Thus, many were happy to hear that Chief Administrative Judge Larry Marks issued Administrative Order 270/2020 (“AO 270/20”), which incorporated features of the Commercial Division into the Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme and County Courts (the “Uniform Rules”). My colleague
Proximate cause is a necessary element in tort law, but also applies to claims of breach of commercial contract. 
In a recent decision by Justice Barry R. Ostrager in MUFG Union Bank, N.A. v. Axos Bank et al., No. 652474/2019, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 51101(U) (Sup. Ct., New York County Sept. 25, 2020), the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court, New York County addressed, among other things, the issue of whether a defendant’s breach was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s damages in denying one defendant’s motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.
The parties to the action are MUFG Union Bank, N.A. (“Union”), Epiq Systems, Inc. (“Epiq”), and Axos Bank, Axos Fiduciary Services, Axos Nevada, LLC, and Seller Sub, LLC (collectively, “Axos”).
On or about September 27, 2012, Union and Epiq entered into a Joint Services Agreement (“JSA”), effective October 1, 2012, as amended. Pursuant to the JSA, Union and Epiq agreed, among other things, “to jointly promote their products and services to bankruptcy and insolvency professionals and also fiduciary types as may be agreed upon by the parties on a case-by-case basis,” which professional and fiduciary types were deemed “Joint Clients”. Specifically, Union provided deposit services to bankruptcy trustee customers and Epiq provided software services to bankruptcy trustee customers. The JSA expressly restricted Union and Epiq’s ability to assign the JSA or transfer Joint Client relationships or accounts without the other’s prior written consent. Notwithstanding this restriction, Epiq, without consent of Union, decided to sell its software business to Axos. In order to circumvent the anti-assignment provision in the JSA, Epiq established Seller Sub, LLC (“Seller Sub”), identified as “a special purpose entity wholly owned by Epiq and allegedly created for the sole purpose of effectuating the transfer of the JSA to Axos without Union’s consent.” Epiq formed Seller Sub one day before entering into a fifh amendment of the JSA with Union. Epiq then transferred the JSA to Seller Sub. Axos then acquired Seller Sub with the JSA. But Epiq directly transferred its software business to Axos. Thereafter, Axos terminated the JSA with Union and the action ensued.
Continue Reading Proximate Cause In Breach Of Contract Actions: Is Loss A Foreseeable Consequence Of Circumstances Created By The Breaching Party?
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n 2015, our colleagues in the white-collar criminal defense bar braced for the impact of a memorandum penned by then Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates. The Yates Memo encouraged both federal prosecutors and civil enforcement attorneys to make increased efforts to hold culpable individuals accountable for corporate misconduct.
The Yates Memo embodied the precept
Our parents taught us to think before we speak. That lesson is especially important when words or conduct could cost you hundreds of thousands of dollars beyond what was previously agreed upon in a subcontract agreement.
In a recent case before Justice Andrea Masley, Corporate Electrical Technologies, Inc. v. Structure Tone, Inc. et al.
Many litigants are familiar with the well-settled rule that an affirmative defense will be waived if it is not included in a CPLR 3211(a) motion to dismiss or in the answer (see CPLR 3211[e]). And so, lawyers tasked with drafting an answer will often consult a “checklist” to ensure that all relevant affirmative
In a recent decision by the New York County Commercial Division (Borrok, J.), the Court held that New York law, not Swiss law, applies to a dispute involving the ownership of the storied Princie Diamond – an extremely rare and valuable 34.65 carat pink diamond quarried from the legendary Golconda mines of India. In a
There is a general policy in New York against allowing multiple or successive motions for summary judgment. And it stands to reason. After all, the word “summary,” from the Latin summa (as in Thomas Aquinas), refers to the essence, epitome, or totality of a thing; to a comprehensive statement that captures the whole, often