For claims to recover money due on an instrument, CPLR 3213 can provide a faster path to judgment than a plenary action—but only if its procedural requirements are strictly followed.
CPLR 3213 permits a party to move for summary judgment in lieu of complaint when the claim is based on an instrument for the payment
Although discretionary, it is well-known among commercial practitioners that the Commercial Division justices generally like a Rule 19-a statement of material facts included with the submission of a summary judgment motion. When responding to a Rule 19-a statement, the responding party should be thinking a couple moves ahead. The ultimate goal should be to make
The COVID-19 pandemic has unsurprisingly resulted in many people in the business community, including lawyers, transacting business remotely. With that uptick comes more contracts utilizing electronic signatures and remote depositions and notarizations. Not only is the use of an e-signature generally more convenient for the parties involved in a transaction, but an e-sig provides many more layers of security and protection from claims of forgery than a wet-signature because the process requires the user to confirm her identity to bind her signature to that identity through a digital certificate.
So what happens when there’s a contractual dispute, and one of the parties is seeking to enforce a contract while the counterparty is claiming that its electronic signature has been forged? On October 26, 2023, Justice Daniel J. Doyle of the Monroe County Commercial Division dealt with just that in AJ Equity Group LLC v Office Connection, Inc., in which he held that the defendant’s mere denial that she e-signed an agreement was not sufficient to dismiss a breach of contract claim, but also that the plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on its breach claim for failure to explain the relevance and significance of the signature certificate showing that the electronic signature was valid.
Continue Reading The Evidence Behind E-SIGS
As many practitioners know, it is common to dismiss a complaint for pleading defects that are readily apparent. However, another type of complaint has recently caused a significant amount of confusion in the Commercial Division – the third-party complaint. A recent decision from Bronx Commercial Division Justice Fidel E. Gomez confirms as much, dismissing a third-party complaint where the third-party plaintiffs failed to plead any claims against the third-party defendant that were “rooted in indemnity or contribution.”
Continue Reading What’s Your Contribution? A Cautionary Tale Surrounding Third-Party ComplaintsAs readers of this blog are aware—click here, here, here, and here for related posts—the CPLR 3213 motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint can be a powerful tool to secure an expedited judgment, “meld[ing] pleading and motion practice into one step, allowing a summary judgment motion to be made before
In Castle Restoration & Constr., Inc. v Castle Restoration, LLC, Suffolk County Commercial Division Justice Elizabeth H. Emerson refused to enforce an oral agreement that allegedly modified a prior written agreement between the parties. In this blog post, we see how the Court applied a variety of contractual principals to determine the validity of
It’s not often that a lawsuit in the Commercial Division between sophisticated parties to an arm’s-length business transaction warrants a blistering rebuke of the parties by the Court. But on December 3, 2021, New York County Commercial Division Justice Andrew Borrok issued a scathing decision in a case entitled Extended CHAA Acquisition, LLC v Mahoney
Practitioners often choose to practice in the Commercial Division because of its well-documented efficiencies. Thus, many were happy to hear that Chief Administrative Judge Larry Marks issued Administrative Order 270/2020 (“AO 270/20”), which incorporated features of the Commercial Division into the Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme and County Courts (the “Uniform Rules”). My colleague
Proximate cause is a necessary element in tort law, but also applies to claims of breach of commercial contract. 
In a recent decision by Justice Barry R. Ostrager in MUFG Union Bank, N.A. v. Axos Bank et al., No. 652474/2019, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 51101(U) (Sup. Ct., New York County Sept. 25, 2020), the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court, New York County addressed, among other things, the issue of whether a defendant’s breach was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s damages in denying one defendant’s motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.
The parties to the action are MUFG Union Bank, N.A. (“Union”), Epiq Systems, Inc. (“Epiq”), and Axos Bank, Axos Fiduciary Services, Axos Nevada, LLC, and Seller Sub, LLC (collectively, “Axos”).
On or about September 27, 2012, Union and Epiq entered into a Joint Services Agreement (“JSA”), effective October 1, 2012, as amended. Pursuant to the JSA, Union and Epiq agreed, among other things, “to jointly promote their products and services to bankruptcy and insolvency professionals and also fiduciary types as may be agreed upon by the parties on a case-by-case basis,” which professional and fiduciary types were deemed “Joint Clients”. Specifically, Union provided deposit services to bankruptcy trustee customers and Epiq provided software services to bankruptcy trustee customers. The JSA expressly restricted Union and Epiq’s ability to assign the JSA or transfer Joint Client relationships or accounts without the other’s prior written consent. Notwithstanding this restriction, Epiq, without consent of Union, decided to sell its software business to Axos. In order to circumvent the anti-assignment provision in the JSA, Epiq established Seller Sub, LLC (“Seller Sub”), identified as “a special purpose entity wholly owned by Epiq and allegedly created for the sole purpose of effectuating the transfer of the JSA to Axos without Union’s consent.” Epiq formed Seller Sub one day before entering into a fifh amendment of the JSA with Union. Epiq then transferred the JSA to Seller Sub. Axos then acquired Seller Sub with the JSA. But Epiq directly transferred its software business to Axos. Thereafter, Axos terminated the JSA with Union and the action ensued.
Continue Reading Proximate Cause In Breach Of Contract Actions: Is Loss A Foreseeable Consequence Of Circumstances Created By The Breaching Party?
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n 2015, our colleagues in the white-collar criminal defense bar braced for the impact of a memorandum penned by then Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates. The Yates Memo encouraged both federal prosecutors and civil enforcement attorneys to make increased efforts to hold culpable individuals accountable for corporate misconduct.
The Yates Memo embodied the precept