In Castle Restoration & Constr., Inc. v Castle Restoration, LLC, Suffolk County Commercial Division Justice Elizabeth H. Emerson refused to enforce an oral agreement that allegedly modified a prior written agreement between the parties. In this blog post, we see how the Court applied a variety of contractual principals to determine the validity of
A recent decision from the First Department reminds us that New York courts are not sympathetic to duress claims when the alleged acts or threatened acts fall within the ambit of the defendant’s rights under a valid agreement.
In Zhang Chang v Phillips Auctioneers LLC, the First Department affirmed Manhattan Commercial Division Justice Jennifer
In recent news out of the world of Formula 1 racing, a tight battle between seven-time World Champion, Lewis Hamilton, and rival, Max Verstappen, came to a head at the first lap of the British Grand Prix at Silverstone. In fighting for dominant position over a high-speed corner, Hamilton’s car inadvertently clipped Verstappen’s, flinging Verstappen’s
A cause of action accrues, triggering the commencement of the statute of limitations period, when “all of the factual circumstances necessary to establish a right of action have occurred, so that the plaintiff would be entitled to relief” (Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.). The “continuing wrong” doctrine is an exception
The statute of limitations to recover on a breach of contract is six years. Parties can extend that limitations periods by agreement, and New York General Obligations Law 17-101 governs the form of such agreements. It provides that, “[a]n acknowledgment or promise contained in a writing signed by the party to be charged thereby is the only competent evidence of a new or continuing contract whereby to take an action out of the operation of the provisions of limitations of time for commencing actions under the civil practice law and rules. . . ” Per GOL 17-101, only signed writings acknowledging the indebtedness and promising to pay are sufficient to extend the statute of limitations.
In considering whether a writing satisfies GOL 17-101 and extends a statute of limitations, Courts require three elements: Signature, Content, and Delivery.
First, the acknowledgement must be “signed by the party to be charged thereby.” See 20 Plaza Hous. Corp. v. 20 Plaza E. Realty, 950 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Aug. 30, 2012) (Section 17-101 inapplicable because acknowledgment was “not signed by defendant”).
Second, the acknowledgment must convey “an intention to pay Plaintiff’s debt.” See Knoll v. Datek Sec. Corp., 2 A.D.3d 594, 595 (2d Dep’t 2003) (“[T]he critical determination is whether the acknowledgment imports an intention to pay.”). If the writing is at all inconsistent with an unequivocal intention to repay the debt, the writing fails the requirements of GOL 17-101.
Third, the acknowledgment “must have been communicated to the plaintiff or someone acting on his behalf, or intended to influence the plaintiff’s conduct.” See Lynford v. Williams, 34 A.D.3d 761, 763 (2d Dep’t 2006) (Section 17-101 inapplicable where “plaintiff did not learn of the [purported acknowledgments] until after he commenced this action”).
In part because GOL 17-101 was intended to limit the instances in which an acknowledgment revives a cause of action, Courts strictly enforce each of the three requirements. A writing failing any of the Signature, Content, or Delivery requirements is insufficient to restart the statute of limitations. While the requirements of GOL 17-101 are strictly enforced, not every ambiguity in the acknowledgment will defeat its enforcement. Recently, in Hawk Mtn. LLC v. RAM Capital Group LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op. 01349, the First Department held that an acknowledgement was sufficient to satisfy GOL 17-101 and restart the statute of limitations, despite its failure to specifically refer to the debt and inconsistencies between the acknowledgment and the underling note.Continue Reading General Statement of Indebtedness is Sufficient to Restart Statute of Limitations Despite Ambiguities
Disputes over the scope of insurance coverage are common fixtures in the Commercial Division Courts. Earlier this month, the First Department partially affirmed Justice Sherwood’s decision in Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Schorsch et al. Considering a matter of first impression in the New York Commercial Division Courts, the decision holds that a D&O policy’s
As we continue to see increased litigation over electronic programs, apps, and algorithms, courts are increasingly called to consider discovery requests for the coding behind that technology. These requests highlight the tension between the need for broad discovery and the litigant’s proprietary interest in secret, commercially valuable source code. And as a recent First Department
Perhaps it’s because I’ll be speaking on the topic later this week, or perhaps it’s because of a recent post on another one of our blogs, but shareholder rights of inspection have been on the mind of late.
While researching 2018 New York cases addressing inspection rights, particularly in the Commercial Division, I came across
Chief Judge Janet DiFiore announced on Tuesday (February 6) in her State of Our Judiciary Address, that the Appellate Divisions in all four Departments will be rolling out electronic filing rules for certain cases. Of particular interest to commercial litigators is the First and Fourth Departments, in which the rule announcement specifically identifies commercial