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James R. Maguire handles a broad range of complex commercial litigation matters, with a focus on construction law. He advises owners, general contractors, and subcontractors in all aspects of construction litigation, including construction defect cases, payment disputes, delay and inefficiency claims, terminations for default, and performance bond claims. In these matters, James actively engages in legal research and analysis, discovery, and dispositive motion practice.

As readers of this blog are well aware, we here at New York Commercial Division Practice take great pride in posting about proposed or amended rules of practice in the Commercial Division. Knowledge of the local rules is particularly relevant when filing documents. One recent local rule change that may catch our readers’ eyes is Nassau County Supreme Court’s new procedures for filing an order to show cause .

Litigants generally have two options when bringing a motion before a court in New York State: (i) a motion on notice; or (ii) a motion brought by order to show cause. An order to show cause is typically used for emergency applications or when a litigant is seeking some form of immediate relief, such as a stay or temporary restraining order. As part of an application for an order to show cause, a party’s attorney must submit an affirmation under 22 NYCRR § 202.7(f), which provides that the opposing party has been given notice of the date, place, and time that the application will be filed with the court in order to appear in response to the application. This is where things get interesting.Continue Reading A Good Lawyer Knows the Law; A Great Lawyer Also Knows the Local Rules

Although discretionary, it is well-known among commercial practitioners that the Commercial Division justices generally like a Rule 19-a statement of material facts included with the submission of a summary judgment motion. When responding to a Rule 19-a statement, the responding party should be thinking a couple moves ahead. The ultimate goal should be to make things easier for the judge to accept clearly stated facts that cannot be contested before the commencement of a trial. The last thing that you want to happen is to be caught in a Steve Urkel “did i do that ” moment in failing to dispute a contested fact. A recent decision issued by Manhattan Commercial Division Justice Robert R. Reed sheds light on the consequences of that very scenario.

Background and Analysis:

Perella Weinberg Partners LLC et al. v Michael A. Kramer et al., involved a breach-of-contract dispute related to the defendants’ departure from the plaintiffs’ financial-advisory firm. During the course of the litigation, both parties moved for summary judgment on their respective claims and counterclaims. As part of their submissions, the parties submitted and responded to their respective Rule 19-a statements.Continue Reading A Cautious Reminder When Responding to a Rule 19-a Statement of Material Facts on a Motion for Summary Judgment

As many practitioners are aware, the litigation process in New York often feels like a tortoise race, with many cases taking years to resolve. Section 3213 of the CPLR (“Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint”) is a bit of an outlier in New York practice, as it provides a mechanism to streamline cases without bearing the delay of protracted litigation. However, because a  CPLR 3213  motion provides for a remedy which precludes a litigant from presenting his evidence to a judge or jury, courts heavily scrutinize this type of motion.

For example, courts tend to dismiss CPLR 3213  motions where the instrument for payment (e.g., a promissory note) requires “outside proof … other than simple proof of nonpayment or a similar de minimis deviation from the face of the document” (Kitchen Winners NY, Inc. v Triptow, 226 AD3d 989, 991 [2d Dept 2024]). But what happens when an additional document (e.g., a Heter Iska) is required to be executed under religious law in connection with a promissory note? This question was recently addressed by Kings County Commercial Division Justice Leon Ruchelsman  in Junik v 61 N. 11 LLC.  Continue Reading The Proof Is in the Note: Commercial Division Holds a Heter Iska Is Not Outside Proof for Purposes of Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint

As readers of this blog are aware, the most contentious battles during a lawsuit are fought during discovery. Among the various discovery battles is scheduling depositions. In many cases, parties tend to reschedule depositions, which typically drags out the length of a litigation. The worst decision a party can make is failing to appear for a deposition. As a recent decision from Manhattan Commercial Division Justice Margaret Chan shows, New York courts will dispose of a case (i.e., striking of a pleading) for a party’s repeated failure to appear for a scheduled deposition.

In O’Rourke v Hammerstein Ballroom,  Defendants moved separately, pursuant to CPLR §§ 3124 and 3126, requesting several forms of discovery sanctions against Plaintiff, including (i) dismissal and/or striking of the complaint; (ii) precluding Plaintiff from offering testimony or evidence in support of his claims; and (iii) monetary sanctions, for Plaintiff’s repeated failure to appear at court-ordered depositions. Specifically, between November 19, 2021, to January 24, 2024, the Court held eight discovery conferences with the parties and scheduled Plaintiff’s deposition each time. However, Plaintiff failed to appear for each of his eight separate court-ordered depositions.Continue Reading A Deposition Wake Up Call: Commercial Division Strikes Pleading for Repeated Failure to Appear for a Deposition

As readers of this blog no doubt are aware, clients sometimes take a “shoot first, ask questions later” approach during the early stages of litigation. This is especially true when bringing a CPLR 3213 motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, which, under narrow circumstances, provides an accelerated procedure for litigants to obtain a

In many cases, clients tend to place their trust, and often their livelihood, in the hands of their attorney. This expectation can be easily traced back to the attorney-client privilege, one of the oldest common-law privileges for confidential communications.  In some instances, the attorney-client privilege may extend to third parties under the common-interest doctrine, which

Whether in employment agreements or business transactions, drafters often include certain clauses within these documents to protect their client if litigation arises (e.g., arbitration clauses, forum- selection clauses). However, when not clearly drafted, these clauses can lead to a battle over where the case may proceed. Recently, Manhattan Commercial Division Justice Joel M. Cohen handed

A confession of judgment has often been viewed as an important tool in settling a litigation or finalizing a transaction.  In 2019, the New York State Legislature made some significant amendments to the Confession of Judgment law (CPLR § 3218), particularly eliminating the ability of creditors to file confessions of judgment against non-New York residents.  As a result, the amended CPLR § 3218 provides that the confession must state the county in which “the defendant resided when it was executed,” and that the confession may only be filed in that county or, if the defendant moved to a different county within New York after signing the confession, “where the defendant resided at the time of filing.”  In a recent decision, Kings County Commercial Division Justice Leon Ruchelsman  addressed the damaging consequences of altering a confession of judgment to meet the “residency” requirements of CPLR § 3218.

Background

In Porges v Kleinman, plaintiff commenced an action stemming from a real estate investment opportunity in New Jersey.  Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant pressured plaintiff to obtain a high cost loan to finance the purchase of the property while not allowing plaintiff to conduct any due diligence.  Following the closing, plaintiff alleged that defendant pressured him into signing a promissory note and confession of judgment for $675,000.00.  Approximately a year after the closing, defendant commenced a separate action, which was later consolidated with the present action, to enforce the confession of judgment due to plaintiff’s alleged failure to make any payments towards the promissory note.

During the course of the litigation, plaintiff brought a motion to vacate the confession of judgment, arguing that the confession of judgment (i) did not specify the county in which plaintiff resided; and (ii) was altered by striking out “County of New York” and writing in “County of Kings” in the caption.  In opposition, defendant argued that the alteration of the caption was made at the express instruction of the Kings County Clerk’s office to allow for the confession of judgment to be filed in the appropriate venue.Continue Reading Altering a Confession of Judgment? Think Again!

As many practitioners know, it is common to dismiss a complaint for pleading defects that are readily apparent.  However, another type of complaint has recently caused a significant amount of confusion in the Commercial Division – the third-party complaint. A recent decision from Bronx Commercial Division Justice Fidel E. Gomez  confirms as much, dismissing a third-party complaint where the third-party plaintiffs failed to plead any claims against the third-party defendant that were “rooted in indemnity or contribution.”Continue Reading What’s Your Contribution? A Cautionary Tale Surrounding Third-Party Complaints

The old game of “hide-and-seek” brings many of us back to our childhood as one of our favorite ways to pass time during the summer. As commercial practitioners know, the concept of serving a summons and complaint in a case can be similar to playing an adult version of “hide-and-seek.”  However, the days in which service of a summons and complaint can only be accomplished by physical delivery to a defendant seem outdated in our ever-growing technology reliant society. A recent decision from Manhattan Commercial Division Justice Robert R. Reed confirms as much, finding that service of process by email will suffice when dealing with an elusive litigant.Continue Reading Ready or Not, Here I Come: The Expansion of Substitute Service by Email