Under CPLR 3213, a plaintiff can move for summary judgment in lieu of complaint which, under the right circumstances, serves as a useful tool to avoid extensive litigation and obtain speedy relief. Recently, in JADR Consulting Group Pty Ltd. v Ault Alliance, Inc., some loan sharks attempted to take advantage of the device’s efficiency. Manhattan Commercial Division Justice Margaret A. Chan heard the legendary jaws theme music but was not deterred, instead denying summary judgment and granting the defendant’s cross-motion to dismiss.

Background:

In JADR, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a promissory note in which the defendant promised to repay a principal of $2,756,245.10. However, plaintiff conceded that the defendant only received $2,249,996. The interest rate on the note was set at 16% per annum, and the default rate was set at 24% per annum or the maximum permitted by law.

That note was amended twice. First, a new section was added to include that in the event of a default, the principal would increase by $1,000,000. Second, the maturity date of the note was extended and included that any default would, at the plaintiff’s discretion, extend the maturity date by 30 days, but also add $250,000 to the principal to be repaid. Further, both amendments increased the principal amount despite the fact that the defendant never received additional consideration.Continue Reading You’re Gonna Need a Bigger Boat: Criminal Usury Statutes Prevent Loan Sharks

As many practitioners know, it is common to dismiss a complaint for pleading defects that are readily apparent.  However, another type of complaint has recently caused a significant amount of confusion in the Commercial Division – the third-party complaint. A recent decision from Bronx Commercial Division Justice Fidel E. Gomez  confirms as much, dismissing a third-party complaint where the third-party plaintiffs failed to plead any claims against the third-party defendant that were “rooted in indemnity or contribution.”Continue Reading What’s Your Contribution? A Cautionary Tale Surrounding Third-Party Complaints

The old game of “hide-and-seek” brings many of us back to our childhood as one of our favorite ways to pass time during the summer. As commercial practitioners know, the concept of serving a summons and complaint in a case can be similar to playing an adult version of “hide-and-seek.”  However, the days in which service of a summons and complaint can only be accomplished by physical delivery to a defendant seem outdated in our ever-growing technology reliant society. A recent decision from Manhattan Commercial Division Justice Robert R. Reed confirms as much, finding that service of process by email will suffice when dealing with an elusive litigant.Continue Reading Ready or Not, Here I Come: The Expansion of Substitute Service by Email

As any practitioner litigating a case before the Commercial Division knows, and as we have mentioned time and again on this blog, it is critical to know the Part Rules of the particular judge assigned to your case.  But getting to know your judge – including the judge’s individual preferences and style – may be

It is no secret that employees are often the most likely people to misappropriate an employer’s confidential information or valuable trade secrets. In this particular situation, employers have many options at their disposal, including asserting a claim under the faithless-servant doctrine. In a recent decision from the Manhattan Commercial Division, Justice Melissa A. Crane

As practitioners and readers of this blog are aware, responsive pleadings are foundational documents prepared at the earliest stage of a litigation in which the responding party denies, admits, or states that she lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation. While the substance of the responsive

A few weeks ago, my colleague, Madeline Greenblatt, wrote a blog about a $1.75 million breach of contract action brought against Bob Dylan in the Manhattan Commercial Division. In her blog, Madeline reminded practitioners that New York courts will not consider extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of an unambiguous contract, especially on

[I] irrevocably release and forever discharge [the Company] . . . from any and all actions, causes of action, suits, debts, claims, complaints, liabilities, obligations, charges, contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, damages, expenses, counterclaims, cross-claims, [etc.] whatsoever, in law or equity, known or unknown, [I] ever had, now have, or may have against the [Company] from