A few weeks ago, I blogged about the Arco Acquisitions, LLC, v Tiffany Plaza LLC et al. decision, in which Suffolk County Commercial Division Justice Elizabeth Hazlitt Emerson held that the plaintiff’s fraud claims were barred by the specific disclaimer provisions contained in the parties’ agreement to purchase commercial real property.
A recent decision from
In expensive lawsuits involving fraud claims, the temptation of a defendant to play hide and seek with its assets can be high. To prevent this result, 
CPLR § 6201 provides a mechanism (i.e., prejudgment attachment order) to preserve such assets. However, in a recent decision from the Suffolk County Commercial Division, Justice Elizabeth H.
Nobody likes fraud claims asserted against them. Thankfully for defendants, fraud claims are notoriously difficult to prove, and defendants often try to have these claims dismissed at the pleading stage.
An express disclaimer in a contract is often a popular avenue for litigants facing a fraud claim to move for dismissal. A recent Commercial Division
Just like a bride and groom vow to join together for better or for worse, commercial parties joining together through a joint venture must make a similar promise to share in profits and losses. In a recent decision from the Suffolk County Commercial Division, Justice Elizabeth H. Emerson took a close look at the parties’
Practitioners often choose to practice in the Commercial Division because of its well-documented efficiencies. Thus, many were happy to hear that Chief Administrative Judge Larry Marks issued Administrative Order 270/2020 (“AO 270/20”), which incorporated features of the Commercial Division into the Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme and County Courts (the “Uniform Rules”). My colleague
In a recent Commercial Division case, Justice Elizabeth H. Emerson was asked to determine whether certain parties were bound by an arbitration clause and whether that arbitration clause applied to a particular controversy—two questions typically determined by the court. Then why did Justice Emerson defer these questions to the arbitrator? The answer requires a close
A reminder to practitioners: when a contract is unambiguous, the submission of a hurricane of extrinsic evidence to “interpret” it on a pre-answer motion to dismiss won’t fly.
A breach of contract action brought against Robert Zimmerman a/k/a Bob Dylan and Universal Music seeking to capitalize on the widely-reported blockbuster sale of Dylan’s 600-song catalog
In one of my previous posts, I discussed the basic requirements for bringing a CPLR 3213 motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint. One such requirement (and the one that generates the largest body of case law), is that the document upon which the motion is based qualify as either a “money instrument”
In one of my first posts, entitled Restrictive Covenants: The Importance of Understanding Their Contractual Limits, I wrote about a First Department decision upholding a portion of Justice Andrea Masley’s Order enjoining a defendant modeling agent and agency from unfairly competing, disclosing, or misappropriating the plaintiff’s confidential information and interfering with the plaintiff’s contractual
[I] irrevocably release and forever discharge [the Company] . . . from any and all actions, causes of action, suits, debts, claims, complaints, liabilities, obligations, charges, contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, damages, expenses, counterclaims, cross-claims, [etc.] whatsoever, in law or equity, known or unknown, [I] ever had, now have, or may have against the [Company] from