As many practitioners are aware, the litigation process in New York often feels like a tortoise race, with many cases taking years to resolve. Section 3213 of the CPLR (“Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint”) is a bit of an outlier in New York practice, as it provides a mechanism to streamline cases without bearing the delay of protracted litigation. However, because a  CPLR 3213  motion provides for a remedy which precludes a litigant from presenting his evidence to a judge or jury, courts heavily scrutinize this type of motion.

For example, courts tend to dismiss CPLR 3213  motions where the instrument for payment (e.g., a promissory note) requires “outside proof … other than simple proof of nonpayment or a similar de minimis deviation from the face of the document” (Kitchen Winners NY, Inc. v Triptow, 226 AD3d 989, 991 [2d Dept 2024]). But what happens when an additional document (e.g., a Heter Iska) is required to be executed under religious law in connection with a promissory note? This question was recently addressed by Kings County Commercial Division Justice Leon Ruchelsman  in Junik v 61 N. 11 LLC.  Continue Reading The Proof Is in the Note: Commercial Division Holds a Heter Iska Is Not Outside Proof for Purposes of Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint

A confession of judgment has often been viewed as an important tool in settling a litigation or finalizing a transaction.  In 2019, the New York State Legislature made some significant amendments to the Confession of Judgment law (CPLR § 3218), particularly eliminating the ability of creditors to file confessions of judgment against non-New York residents.  As a result, the amended CPLR § 3218 provides that the confession must state the county in which “the defendant resided when it was executed,” and that the confession may only be filed in that county or, if the defendant moved to a different county within New York after signing the confession, “where the defendant resided at the time of filing.”  In a recent decision, Kings County Commercial Division Justice Leon Ruchelsman  addressed the damaging consequences of altering a confession of judgment to meet the “residency” requirements of CPLR § 3218.

Background

In Porges v Kleinman, plaintiff commenced an action stemming from a real estate investment opportunity in New Jersey.  Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant pressured plaintiff to obtain a high cost loan to finance the purchase of the property while not allowing plaintiff to conduct any due diligence.  Following the closing, plaintiff alleged that defendant pressured him into signing a promissory note and confession of judgment for $675,000.00.  Approximately a year after the closing, defendant commenced a separate action, which was later consolidated with the present action, to enforce the confession of judgment due to plaintiff’s alleged failure to make any payments towards the promissory note.

During the course of the litigation, plaintiff brought a motion to vacate the confession of judgment, arguing that the confession of judgment (i) did not specify the county in which plaintiff resided; and (ii) was altered by striking out “County of New York” and writing in “County of Kings” in the caption.  In opposition, defendant argued that the alteration of the caption was made at the express instruction of the Kings County Clerk’s office to allow for the confession of judgment to be filed in the appropriate venue.Continue Reading Altering a Confession of Judgment? Think Again!

Courts continue to refer to federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claims as “potent weapons” that are equivalent to a “thermonuclear device” in cases involving criminal racketeering activity. So why are we seeing RICO claims in ordinary business litigation disputes, including in the Commercial Division, that bear little to no resemblance to criminal