Nobody likes fraud claims asserted against them. Thankfully for defendants, fraud claims are notoriously difficult to prove, and defendants often try to have these claims dismissed at the pleading stage.
An express disclaimer in a contract is often a popular avenue for litigants facing a fraud claim to move for dismissal. A recent Commercial Division
Just like a bride and groom vow to join together for better or for worse, commercial parties joining together through a joint venture must make a similar promise to share in profits and losses. In a recent decision from the Suffolk County Commercial Division, Justice Elizabeth H. Emerson took a close look at the parties’
Practitioners often choose to practice in the Commercial Division because of its well-documented efficiencies. Thus, many were happy to hear that Chief Administrative Judge Larry Marks issued Administrative Order 270/2020 (“AO 270/20”), which incorporated features of the Commercial Division into the Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme and County Courts (the “Uniform Rules”). My colleague
In a recent Commercial Division case, Justice Elizabeth H. Emerson was asked to determine whether certain parties were bound by an arbitration clause and whether that arbitration clause applied to a particular controversy—two questions typically determined by the court. Then why did Justice Emerson defer these questions to the arbitrator? The answer requires a close
A reminder to practitioners: when a contract is unambiguous, the submission of a hurricane of extrinsic evidence to “interpret” it on a pre-answer motion to dismiss won’t fly.
A breach of contract action brought against Robert Zimmerman a/k/a Bob Dylan and Universal Music seeking to capitalize on the widely-reported blockbuster sale of Dylan’s 600-song catalog
In one of my previous posts, I discussed the basic requirements for bringing a CPLR 3213 motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint. One such requirement (and the one that generates the largest body of case law), is that the document upon which the motion is based qualify as either a “money instrument”
In one of my first posts, entitled Restrictive Covenants: The Importance of Understanding Their Contractual Limits, I wrote about a First Department decision upholding a portion of Justice Andrea Masley’s Order enjoining a defendant modeling agent and agency from unfairly competing, disclosing, or misappropriating the plaintiff’s confidential information and interfering with the plaintiff’s contractual
[I] irrevocably release and forever discharge [the Company] . . . from any and all actions, causes of action, suits, debts, claims, complaints, liabilities, obligations, charges, contracts, controversies, agreements, promises, damages, expenses, counterclaims, cross-claims, [etc.] whatsoever, in law or equity, known or unknown, [I] ever had, now have, or may have against the [Company] from
Parties to a contract generally can include in their agreement a provision preventing assignment of the agreement’s rights and remedies without the consent of both parties. Because a party’s assignment of rights under a contract to a third party may have serious implications for both sides in the performance of that agreement, anti-assignment clauses protect the contracting parties by ensuring that no transfer of the agreement’s rights occurs without the consent of all involved. Dance with the date you brought. And absent fraud, unconscionability, or some other reason to invalidate the contract, courts generally enforce those anti-assignment clauses.
In the insurance context, however, the enforcement of anti-assignment clauses is more complicated. Because insurers—like any contractual party—have a legitimate interest in protecting themselves from insureds’ assignment of the insurance agreement to a different, perhaps more risky party, anti-assignment clauses in insurance agreements are enforceable against assignments that occur prior to a covered loss. Arrowood Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 96 AD3d 693, 694 [1st Dept 2012]. But in circumstances where the assignment occurs after the covered loss, New York courts are more critical of anti-assignment clauses. In those circumstances, courts reason, there is no increased risk to the insured; the loss already occurred, and the only thing that changes as a result of the assignment is who the insurer will need to pay for that loss.
In Certain Underwriters At Lloyd’s, London v AT&T, Corp., 2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 31740[U], a recent decision by New York Commercial Division Justice Cohen, the Court explores the exceptions to the general rules regarding anti-assignment clauses in insurance policies. Ultimately, the case underscores the difficulties insurers face in disclaiming coverage by enforcement of an anti-assignment clause in the policy.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.” In terms of stipulations of settlement, New York courts favor such stipulations and will rarely set them aside absent the