In Miller v. Brunner, the Appellate Division, Second Department spoke clearly (again) about how to move to dismiss on the defense of release.  In a case arising out of the Commercial Division in Kings County (Hon. Sylvia G. Ash), a question on appeal was whether the defense of release is considered “documentary evidence” under CPLR 3211(a)(1) or instead a motion that should be brought under CPLR 3211(a)(5).  The latter, of course, outlines a list of affirmative defenses, including release.  So in defending an action you believe is barred the release, under which section of 3211 do you move?  Either.

The case arose out of a contractual arrangement between plaintiffs and defendants entered in 2014, which restructured a previous agreement relating to development rights of property located in Greenpoint.  Later that year, plaintiffs lent defendants $4.7 million used as collateral for the issuance of three letters of credit by a lender.  A dispute arose over the use of the funds for collateral, and the parties agreed to an amount to be repaid by defendants in exchange for a release.  Plaintiffs later sued, alleging a variety of breaches and for a declaratory judgment.  (As an aside, see last week’s blog discussing pleading both breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims simultaneously.)

Defendants moved to dismiss under “CPLR 3211(a)”, claiming the release barred the claims.  In their moving brief, defendants relied specifically on CPLR 3211(a)(1), a defense based upon documentary evidence, and not CPLR 3211(a)(5), “release”.  The reply papers similarly relied on that section alone.  The motion court ultimately denied the motion to dismiss with leave to renew following discovery.  On appeal, plaintiffs argued that defendants’ failure to move under 3211(a)(5) was fatal on the defense of release.  The Appellate Division disagreed, modified the order below, and directed the dismissal of the first cause of action based upon the release.

The Appellate panel reasoned that even if the incorrect ground under 3211(a) is advanced, so long as one of the 3211(a) grounds apply, then dismissal is warranted, no matter how the motion is denominated.  The court “‘may treat the motion as having specified the right ground and grant relief, absent prejudice'”, citing Dean R. Pelton Co. v. Moundsville Shopping Plaza, Inc.  This follows what the Second Department did also in Alvarez v. Amicucci, where the court upheld dismissal based upon a release in a motion filed under CPLR 3211(a)(1), see also Marc v. Middle Country Center School Dist. (release may be raised by 3211(a)(1) or (5)).  For a good discussion of the history, development and application of CPLR 3211(a)(1), including the relation to CPLR 3211(a)(5), Fontanetta v. John Doe is a worthy read.

So, which ground under CPLR 3211(a) should one move under when raising the defense of release?  It appears either will work, but no harm in moving under both, although the more common seems to be 3211(a)(1).

 

 

 

Your client wants to recover damages for breach of contract and demands that you assert as many causes of action as possible.  In addition to the breach cause of action, you consider a declaratory judgment claim, right?  Wrong!   The Second Department has held time and time again that “[a] cause of action for a declaratory judgment is unnecessary and inappropriate when the plaintiff has an adequate, alternative remedy in another form of action, such as breach of contract” (see BGW v. Mount Kisco; Stuckey v Lutheran Care Found. Network, Inc.; and Alizio v Feldman).

Recently, the Second Department in Tiffany Tower Condominium, LLC, et al. v Insurance Company of the Greater New York reaffirmed this principle. There, Tiffany Tower Condominium, LLC (“Tiffany Tower”) sustained damage to its condominium during Superstorm Sandy. Insurance Company of the Greater New York (the “insurer”) paid Tiffany Tower’s original claim for the damage sustained to the condominium under Tiffany Tower’s insurance policy but when Tiffany Tower submitted a supplemental claim for the additional losses sustained to the condominium as a result of the storm, the insurer denied coverage. As a result, Tiffany Tower initiated a lawsuit seeking, among other things, to recover damages for breach of contract and for a judgment declaring that coverage for the supplemental claim was improperly denied.  The insurer moved to dismiss Tiffany Tower’s second, third, and fourth causes of action for breach of breach of contract, judgment declaring that coverage was improperly denied, and violation of General Business Law § 349, respectively. Justice Ash denied the insurer’s motion to dismiss these causes of action and the insurer appealed.

In its recent decision, the Second Department held that the Supreme Court erred and should have dismissed Tiffany Tower’s cause of action for a declaratory judgment. The Court held that where plaintiff has an “an adequate, alternative remedy in another form of action,” i.e., the breach of contract claim, the declaratory judgment cause of action is thus “unnecessary and inappropriate.”

Interestingly, the First and Fourth Departments have also dismissed declaratory judgment causes of action where plaintiff had an “adequate, alternative remedy in another form of action, such as breach of contract.”  (see Main Evaluations, Inc. v. State; Apple Records, Inc. v. Capital Records, Inc.) The Third Department, however, has had no similar holdings.

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Can substitution of a new plaintiff who has proper standing cause “surprise or prejudice” to a defendant after the statute of limitations would have expired, such that leave to file an amended complaint should be denied? Not if the two plaintiffs are the same person switching from their individual to representative capacity, held the Second Department on August 15, 2018 in D’Angelo v Kujawski.

Plaintiff, “as proposed Administrator [sic]” of her deceased son’s estate, retained Defendants, comprising a law firm, to commence an action against the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) based on medical malpractice that allegedly resulted in her son’s wrongful death. According to Plaintiff’s complaint, in 2011 Defendants filed a Notice of Claim with the VA’s Office of Regional Counsel, but the Notice of Claim negligently failed to reference the VA’s administration of contraindicated medications. After Defendants withdrew from the representation on December 20, 2013, Plaintiff commenced an action with new counsel that was ultimately dismissed by the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York for failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies. Specifically, the court found that Plaintiff had possessed “vital information bearing on the existence of her claim” that was wrongfully excluded from the Notice of Claim.

On December 15, 2016, five days before the statute of limitations would have expired, Plaintiff commenced an action for legal malpractice against Defendants. However, Plaintiff mistakenly named herself individually as the plaintiff, instead of as Administratrix of the Estate. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of an attorney-client relationship with the individual Plaintiff. In response, Plaintiff cross-moved for leave to file an amended complaint, thus setting the stage for the court to determine the applicability of CPLR §§ 305 and 3025 to a request to substitute plaintiffs, as well as whether Plaintiff’s delay in seeking leave past expiration of the statute of limitations would “prejudice or surprise” Defendants.

Relying on Caffaro v Trayna, a 1974 Court of Appeals decision purportedly allowing substitution of plaintiffs and subsequent interposition of time-barred claims in an amended pleading, Commercial Division Justice James Hudson held that Defendants would suffer no prejudice because the original complaint adequately put Defendants on notice of the nature of the claims and allowed the amendment. However, Justice Hudson did not analyze or discuss whether CPLR §§ 305 and 3025 authorized a party without standing to substitute an otherwise time-barred party. Nor did Caffaro, which substituted the estate’s Executrix for the decedent in the decedent’s pending medical malpractice action.

The Second Department affirmed:

“[A]n amendment which would shift a claim from a party without standing to another party who could have asserted that claim in the first instance is proper since such an amendment, by its nature, does not result in surprise or prejudice to the defendants who had prior knowledge of the claim and an opportunity to prepare a proper defense” (JCD Farms v Juul-Nielsen, 300 AD2d 446, 446 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see United Fairness, Inc. v Town of Woodbury, 113 AD3d 754, 755; Matter of Highland Hall Apts., LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 66 AD3d 678, 682; Plotkin v New York City Tr. Auth., 220 AD2d 653, 654).

The Second Department appeared primarily concerned with protecting Defendants from new allegations or claims, rather than whether the “relation back” doctrine codified in CPLR § 203(f) applied in actions commenced by a party without standing. The Second Department did not address authority from the Court of Appeals and other Departments of the Appellate Division that appeared to hold otherwise, such as Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp. v Nomura Credit and Capital, Inc., 139 AD3d 519 (1st Dept 2016). There, the First Department held that an untimely claim could not relate back to a defective summons issued by a plaintiff without standing, “because no valid action was commenced by the filing of that summons.” The Fourth Department held the same in Truty v Fed. Bakers Supply Corp., 217 AD 2d 951 (4th Dept 1995). Both decisions cited Goldberg v Camp Mikan-Recro, 42 NY2d 1029 [1977], in which the Court of Appeals distinguished Caffaro based on the original plaintiff having standing to commence the action.

Practitioners are thus cautioned that between the First and Fourth Departments, on the one hand, and the Second Department, on the other, there appears to be a split as to whether an untimely amended pleading may “relate back” to an earlier action brought by a plaintiff who lacks standing.

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A recent decision out of the Suffolk County Commercial Division underscores the importance of staying on top of your mail if you plan on leaving New York for an extended period of time.  Last week, in Matter of New Brunswick Theological Seminary v Van Dyke, 2018 NY Slip Op 51204(U), Justice Emerson confirmed a $3,229,097 arbitration award against a respondent who failed to appear at an arbitration, claiming she did not receive notice of the proceedings against her.

The respondent was a retired investment banker who, in 2000, entered into an agreement with petitioner to act as its investment advisor and broker. The respondent managed petitioner’s account until May 2016, when the petitioner terminated her services. Thereafter, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) commenced an investigation against respondent in connection with her alleged mishandling of certain customer accounts, including petitioner’s account. The investigation ultimately concluded with respondent being permanently barred from the securities industry.

Petitioner proceeded to arbitrate its claims against the respondent.  Between July and October of 2017, FINRA sent to the respondent several notices regarding the arbitration at the addresses the respondent provided FINRA for service of process. One notice, sent by certified mail to the respondent’s home addresses in New York City and Sag Harbor, was returned as “unclaimed, unable to forward.” But the other notices, sent to the same two addresses, were not returned.

The respondent did not appear at the arbitration. Nevertheless, the arbitrator determined that, since the respondent had been served with several notices by regular mail and by certified mail, she would be bound by the arbitrator’s ruling and determination, which ultimately awarded petitioner $3,229,097.00, with interest. Thereafter, the petitioner commenced a proceeding to confirm the arbitrator’s award, and the respondent cross-moved to vacate the award, arguing that: (1) the arbitrator erred in finding that service had been effected, (2) respondent had been deprived of due process, and (3) it would be fundamentally unfair to confirm the arbitration award under the circumstances.

According to the respondent, she had been in California for five months and did not receive notice of the arbitration until January 19, 2018, when she was served with the petition and arbitration award at her home in Sag Harbor. She claimed that, while in California, the mail sent to her Sag Harbor address was held at the Post Office, and the mail sent to her New York City address was de minimus enough to fit into the mailbox, and remained there until she returned to New York. Respondent further claimed that, upon returning to New York, she did not “prioritize going through the months of held mail and that she was still going through it when she was served with the petition and arbitration award on January 19, 2018” and that petitioner should have attempted to advise her of the arbitration through email.

Justice Emerson declined to vacate the arbitration award, holding that the respondent was not deprived of due process. First, Justice Emerson found that the respondent knew, or should have known, that the petitioner might proceed to arbitration while she was in California. Indeed, the respondent was a seasoned investment banker and broker who knew that FINRA had opened an investigation concerning her mishandling of petitioner’s account, and that that investigation concluded with respondent being permanently barred from the securities industry. According to Justice Emerson, respondent should have expected that petitioner would pursue its arbitral remedies against her and yet, “the respondent left for California for five months without advising FINRA of her address in California and without forwarding her mail.”

Next, Justice Emerson noted the respondent’s continued obligation to maintain and update her address with FINRA for service of process, even though she was permanently barred from the securities industry. Because the respondent failed to do so, FINRA was left with no choice but to serve respondent at the addresses it had on file for service of process. Accordingly, the Court found that, under the Court of Appeals’ holding in Beckman v Greentree Securities, Inc., 87 NY2d 568, 570 (1996), the notices were “reasonably calculated to apprise the respondent of the pendency of the arbitration and to afford her an opportunity to present her objections.” And so, even though one of the notices was returned as “unclaimed,” additional mailings were sent to the same two addresses, none of which were returned.

Last, the Court found that the respondent “made no effort to ensure that she received mail from FINRA while in California, although she knew or should have known that petitioner might proceed to arbitration.” Specifically, the respondent “failed to provide FINRA with her address in California, as required, and failed to have her mail forwarded.” Indeed, there was correspondence from FINRA waiting for respondent when she eventually came back to New York, which respondent also ignored. Under these circumstances, the Court found that “a strong inference may be drawn that the respondent was attempting to avoid receiving any mail from FINRA and that she ignored the mail that was received.”

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I made two observations coming out of Grand Central Station during my morning commute last week. First, the city really stinks after a string of oppressively hot and humid summer days. Second, there appears to be a temporary taxi stand, perhaps occasioned by the ongoing construction of the new One Vanderbilt building, just outside the south entrance of Grand Central Terminal on 42nd Street under the Park Avenue Viaduct.

This latter observation was rather rudely forced upon me when the precarious position of one such cab nearly caused me to traverse its front-end Bo and Luke Duke style. The site of the mangled NYC taxi medallion fastened to the cab’s dented hood was a striking metaphor for the current state of the taxi industry given the increasing popularity of ride-sharing services like Uber and Lyft.

The plight of the cabbie was on display in a recent decision from the Honorable O. Peter Sherwood of the Manhattan Commercial Division in a case called Capital One Equip. v Deus, in which the cabbie-defendants, after defaulting on a promissory note representing more than $400,000 borrowed to purchase a taxi medallion, attempted to rest on the traditional contractual defense of impracticability or impossibility of performance in a summary proceeding under CPLR 3213.

The essence of Defendants’ claim was that “due to the economic change in the medallion and taxi industry of New York by ride sharing applications like Uber and Lyft, there is an impossible hurdle for the defendants to overcome, making the repayment of the loan impossible.”

Readers may recall from their law-school hornbook days that the impossibility defense contemplates truly unexpected circumstances. As the plaintiff-lender in the Deus case put it, “the impossibility defense . . . only excuses a party’s contractual performance where there has been destruction or obstruction by God, a superior force, or by law.”

The cabbies, however, likened their situation to the kind of critical condition contemplated by the traditional defense, describing the industry as being “on life support with little to no chance for a reversal of its current dire situation.”

“At the heart of the problems facing the NYC Taxi industry,” cried the cabbies, “is the emergence of companies such as Uber and Lyft which are exempt from the regulatory framework burdening the medallion owners.” As a result, “ridership in New York City yellow taxi cabs has dropped almost 30%” and “NYC taxi medallions, which were selling for in excess of $1,000,000 as recently as 2013, have plummeted in market value” – all of which has led to a “collapse of unprecedented proportions.”

A creative argument to be sure, but the court wasn’t buying it. Citing New York case law going back to the late 1960’s, the court ultimately held for the plaintiff-lender, finding that “performance of a contract is not excused where impossibility or difficulty of performance is occasioned only by financial difficulty or economic hardship. Economic hardship alone cannot excuse performance; the impossibility must be produced by an unanticipated event that could not have been foreseen or guarded against in the contract.”

Coming on the heels of several driver suicides in recent months, the Deus decision is just more bad news for the NYC taxi industry. While market forces created by the advent of ride-sharing services may not be “superior” enough to satisfy the impossibility defense, one thing’s for sure: it’s a difficult time to be a taxi driver in New York City.

**UPDATE**  Perhaps the cabbies are seeing a little light after all. Around the time this post was published last week, news broke that the New York City Council had tugged the reigns of the Uber/Lyft ride-sharing industry by passing minimum-wage requirements for drivers, as well as a one-year freeze on the licensing of participating vehicles in the city. The first-of-their-kind bills, particularly the cap on e-hail cars, was driven in large part by increased problems related to city-street congestion. Today, Mayor de Blasio signed the bills into law.

 

The Appellate Division, in a short but direct ruling, reminds the bench and bar that courts cannot simply “search the record” and grant summary judgment on claims or defenses that are not the subject of the motion.  It did so this time in the context of an LLC judicial dissolution action pending in the Commercial Division of Nassau Supreme in Philogene v. Duckett.  This follows another recent decision by the same court two weeks earlier in  Singletary v. Alhalai Rest., Inc., a personal injury action.

The procedural setting in Philogene is somewhat unusual.  Plaintiff and defendant are 50/50 members of Verity Associates, LLC (“Verity”), which publishes cookbooks and recipes, such as America’s Most Wanted Recipes and Tried and True Recipe Secrets, through the internet.  Plaintiff commenced the action in his “individual” capacity, as well as “suing in the right” of Verity.  In his complaint, he asserted various claims, including breaches of fiduciary duty and contract, where he sought injunctive relief, damages and an accounting.  In turn, defendant counterclaimed for judicial dissolution and moved for summary judgment on that claim.  The motion court denied defendant’s motion for dissolution since it found that the stated purpose of the entity was being met and that it was financially feasible to continue Verity.  The court then “searched the record” concluding that “no further adjustment in their interests is necessary” and dismissed the complaint.

So what is the reach of a court’s authority to “search the record” and grant reverse summary judgment?

We’re all familiar with CPLR 3212(b) which empowers a court to “search the record” and award judgment to the non-movant.  In fact, if a court searches the record and concludes the non-movant should win, then the court has both the “power” and “responsibility” to render judgment accordingly, see Merritt Vineyards, Inc. v. Windy Heights Vineyard, Inc.  This authority, however, is not boundless.  The leading case from the Court of Appeals on the scope of this power is Dunham v. Hilco Constr. Co., where Chief Judge Kaye observed that, “[a]part from considerations of simple fairness, allowing a summary judgment motion by any party to bring up for review every claim and defense asserted by every other party would be tantamount to shifting the well-accepted burden of proof on summary judgment motions.”  Some courts have expressed  frustration with this limitation (e.g.,  “Although the Court would like nothing better than to put this case out of its misery, given Dunham . . . the Court will decline defendant’s invitation to search the record.”)  But by now, the law is clear that CPLR 3212(b) permits “searching the record” in the context of summary judgment is only appropriate on issues or claims raised by the motion, and nothing more.

Notwithstanding the narrow authority courts have to “search the record” in the context of a dispositive motion, this should not be confused with a court’s authority to decide non-dispositive motions (such as discovery related) on grounds other than those advanced by the parties in the motion papers, see, e.g., Tirado v. Miller (granting discovery related motion on grounds not argued by the parties).  For a good discussion of this distinction, the First Department’s ruling in Rosenblatt v. St. George Health and Racquetball Assocs., LLC is instructive.

 

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In a recent decision, Justice Scarpulla of the New York County Commercial Division declined to exercise personal jurisdiction over several Japanese entities, and even imposed sanctions on the plaintiff for attempting to relitigate its already-decided claims in New York.

Defendant ANA Aircraft Technics, Co., Ltd. (“ANA Technics”) maintained a fleet of airplanes owned and operated by its parent, All Nippon Airways, Co., Ltd. (“ANA”).  In early 2003, ANA Technics entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with plaintiff Kyowa Seni, Co., Ltd. (“Kyowa”), pursuant to which Kyowa agreed, among other things, to manufacture seat covers for ANA Technics.

After Kyowa began manufacturing the seat covers, ANA Technics allegedly directed Kyowa to: (1) affix TSO C127a labels onto the seat covers, demonstrating that the seat covers had been flammability tested in accordance with U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) regulations, and (2) execute certificates affirming the seat covers had been flammability tested.

Kyowa alleged it initially executed the certificates because it believed the required testing was performed, but subsequently requested confirmation that ANA Technics had conducted all of the necessary fire tests and possessed the certifications necessary to obtain the FAA labels. When ANA Technics failed to respond to Kyowa’s requests, Kyowa informed ANA Technics that it would not execute any additional certificates until it received confirmation that the testing was performed.

On October 1, 2004, ANA Technics terminated the MOU, claiming that Kyowa’s work was “substandard.” Kyowa brought an action in Japan (the “Japanese Action”) alleging, among other things, that ANA Technics terminated the MOU to conceal the unlawful TSO C127a labeling. Ultimately, the Japanese Action was dismissed, and that dismissal was upheld on appeal.

Kyowa then brought an action against ANA Technics and other related entities (collectively, the “ANA Companies”) in New York Supreme Court for fraud based on the same acts and transactions set forth in the Japanese Action. The ANA Companies moved to dismiss arguing, among other things, lack of personal jurisdiction. The ANA Companies also moved for sanctions against Kyowa on the ground that Kyowa’s lawsuit was an attempt to relitigate the same claims which were dismissed in the Japanese Action.

First, Justice Scarpulla rejected Kyowa’s argument that the ANA Companies were subject to general jurisdiction merely because the defendant companies were registered in New York and appointed the Secretary of State as their agent for service of process. According to the Court, the ANA Companies’ “simple registration in New York is an insufficient ground for this Court to exercise general jurisdiction over them.” Moreover, the fact that the ANA Companies, which are all incorporated and headquartered in Japan, derive some revenue from their New York flight operations “is plainly insufficient to render the ANA Companies ‘essentially at home’ in New York”.

Second, the Court declined to exercise specific jurisdiction over the ANA Companies under either CPLR §§ 302(a)(1) (transaction of business) or 302(a)(2) (tortious acts committed within the state). Specifically, the Court held there was no “articulable nexus” or “substantial relationship” between New York and Kyowa’s claims arising out of ANA Technics’ termination of the MOU.  And, the Court noted that Kyowa failed to allege any tortious act that the ANA Companies committed in New York. Indeed, the MOU was executed in Japan, any alleged misrepresentations occurred in Japan, the seat covers were manufactured in Japan, and any alleged harm to Kyowa occurred in Japan.

Last, the Court agreed that sanctions were warranted under 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 because the “action is meritless and without a good faith basis.” According to the Court, “there is simply no basis for a New York court to assert jurisdiction over a dispute between Japanese entities, a dispute which has no specific connection to New York or its citizens.” Importantly, the Court noted that Kyowa’s claims were already fully litigated and disposed of in the Japanese Action.

As demonstrated in Kyowa Seni, Justices in the Commercial Division have very little patience for litigants who assert frivolous arguments and attempt to relitigate previously decided claims.  While the result in this case may seem harsh to some, a full reading of the Court’s decision reveals that Justice Scarpulla gave plaintiff the opportunity to withdraw its action and avoid sanctions.  Despite fair warning, Plaintiff declined to do so.

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For those unfamiliar with what today’s young kids are listening to, Aubrey “Drake” Graham is one of the most commercially-successful recording artists of all time, with multiple multiple-platinum records to his credit. For frame of reference, Drake’s recent album “Scorpion,” on its first day of release, was streamed over 300 million times on Apple Music and Spotify alone. In other words, Drake generates enough revenue to rap about his taxes: “Nowadays it’s six-figures when they tax me/ Oh well, guess you lose some and win some, long as the outcome is income.”

Aspire Music Group (“Aspire”) was the fortunate record label with the foresight to enter into an Exclusive Recording Artist Agreement with Drake in 2008, when he was still relatively unknown. In 2009, Aspire provided Drake’s services to a joint venture between Cash Money Records (“Cash Money”) and Dwayne Carter’s (aka rapper “Lil Wayne”) company Young Money Entertainment (“Young Money”), in exchange for a third of net profits from Drake’s albums and a third of the copyrights, and for monthly accounting statements.

The sordid history between Cash Money and Lil Wayne is a story for another blog, but suffice it to say that by 2015, Cash Money’s principals were short on both cash and money. Lil Wayne sued Cash Money and its principals for $51 million in January 2015. Universal Music Group (“Universal”) stepped in. Since its inception in 1998, Universal Music Group (“Universal”) had served as Cash Money’s music distributor. However, as alleged by Aspire, in 2015 Universal advanced large sums of money to Cash Money and agreed to take on certain of Cash Money’s liabilities in exchange for unfettered control over a significant portion of Cash Money’s business operations.

Aspire filed a lawsuit in New York County Supreme Court in April 2017 against Cash Money and its principals, Young Money, and Universal. According to Aspire, Cash Money and Young Money had failed to pay Enough Money to Aspire for Drake-related profits, and Universal was liable as Cash Money’s alter ego.

Universal moved to dismiss, arguing that (i) Universal did not own Cash Money, so could not be its alter ego; (ii) Universal was not alleged to be the alter ego of Young Money and therefore not responsible for Young Money’s actions; (iii) Aspire’s rights are governed by a contract to which Universal was not a party; and (iv) Aspire’s allegations of domination and control are conclusory.

In an Order entered on July 3, 2018, Justice Barry R. Ostrager denied Universal’s motion to dismiss. Although recognizing that New York courts do not apply alter-ego liability on non-owners, the court found that Aspire had sufficiently alleged facts suggesting that Universal had obtained “equitable ownership” over Cash Money. Aspire had alleged that, pursuant to contracts, Universal shared offices with Cash Money, operated its website, intermingled its business affairs, and kept Cash Money undercapitalized and entirely dependent on advances and direct payments from Universal. Citing the First Department’s 2000 decision in Trans. International Corp. v. Clear View Technologies, Ltd., the court found that such allegations were sufficient to confer equitable ownership, and thus alter-ego liability, on a non-owner.

It is not clear that the Clear View Technologies decision involved a non-owner, non-director defendant. In its reply brief, Universal cited allegations in the complaint that “each invidividual defendant is and at all relevant times, was an officer, director and shareholder of Clear View.” After acknowledging a long line of New York decisions declining to impose alter ego liability against non-owners, Justice Ostrager concluded that such liability was nonetheless permitted under New York law. However, the court cited only federal cases from the Second Circuit in support.

As for Universal’s other arguments, the court held that Cash Money was liable for Young Money’s acts in furtherance of their joint venture partnership, and therefore Universal need not be alleged to be Young Money’s alter-ego. And Universal’s absence from Aspire’s contract with the joint venture was irrelevant, because Universal did not become Cash Money’s alter ego until 2015. Aspire did not know of Universal’s role at the time it entered the contract with Cash Money.

It remains to be seen whether sufficient evidence exists of Universal’s alleged control over Cash Money. Either way, be forewarned: too much contractual control over a borrower can potentially give rise to liability for that borrower’s obligations.

In May 2013, professional golfer Vijay Singh (“Singh”) brought suit against PGA Tour, an organizer of the leading men’s professional golf tours and events in North America, in Vijay Singh v. PGA Tour, Inc. PGA Tour enacted an Anti-Doping Program, which prohibits golfers from using certain substances. The list of prohibited substances was adopted from the list maintained by the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”). A few years after the Anti-Doping Program was enacted, Singh began using a performance-enhancing substance, deer antler spray, for his knee and back problems.

Although Singh tested negative for any banned substance, PGA Tour, which sent the spray for testing, determined that the spray contained prohibited substances. As a result, PGA Tour concluded that Singh violated the Anti-Doping Program and, as a result, suspended him from activities related to PGA Tour’s organization. PGA Tour subsequently dropped its disciplinary action and revoked Singh’s suspension after WADA announced that deer antler spray is not a prohibited substance.

Singh sued PGA Tour in the New York County Commercial Division for, among other things, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and conversion. Nearly three years later, Singh moved for partial summary judgment on his breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cause of action. PGA Tour moved for summary judgment on the causes of action for conversion and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

In May 2017, Justice Eileen Bransten granted in part and denied in part PGA Tour’s motion for summary judgment. She dismissed Singh’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and denied in part Singh’s motion for partial summary judgment on that claim. The Court determined there were issues of fact regarding whether PGA Tour breached the implied covenant of good faith by failing to consult with the WADA, upon which PGA Tour clearly relied in issuing its list of prohibited substances, prior to suspending Singh. The Court also concluded there were issues of fact pertaining to what, if any, damage Singh suffered as a result of his suspension and PGA Tour’s making public statements regarding his use of the substance. Justice Bransten also dismissed Plaintiff’s cause of action for conversion on the basis that PGA Tour demonstrated compliance with the Anti-Doping Program, thus establishing that PGA Tour was entitled to escrow Plaintiff’s funds from the date of Singh’s alleged violation to the end of his suspension.

Recently, the Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Justice Bransten’s decision. PGA Tour’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Singh’s cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was denied. The Court held that the determination as to whether PGA Tour exercised discretion “arbitrarily, irrationally or in bad faith by failing to confer with or defer to” the WADA prior to suspending Singh and making public statements regarding his use of the deer antler spray is an issue of fact for the jury to determine. The First Department relied on Dalton v. Educational Testing Serv., which held that “[w]here a contract contemplates the exercise of discretion, this pledge includes a promise not to act arbitrarily or irrationally.” Indeed, the Court went on to determine that within the obligation to exercise good faith are “promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding were included.” In that regard, the Court held that issues of fact exist on whether the public statements made by PGA Tour representatives implicating Singh’s substance use were a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and whether and what damage Singh suffered as a result thereof. The Court also affirmed the earlier decision dismissing the claim to the extent it relied on Singh’s allegation that he was treated differently than other similarly situated professional golfers.

 Commercial Division litigators often hope that mediation will lead to a negotiated settlement, but their expectation – based on their prior experience –  is that it will not.  In this sense, mediation seems to have significant unrealized potential as a settlement tool in the Commercial Division.

 

A new proposal of the ADR Committee of the Commercial Division Advisory Council, put out for public comment on June 22nd by OCA, seeks to tap into some of that unrealized potential in a relatively simple way: by encouraging parties to Commercial Division litigation who are going to mediation to select jointly their preferred mediator.  Could this simple idea make a difference?  Evidence cited by the ADR Committee- both anecdotal and statistical – suggests that mediation is much more likely to be successful when the parties agree on their mediator.

 

In its proposal, the ADR Committee noted that joint selection of a mediator is a factor consistently cited by Bar Associations for enhancing the effectiveness of mediation in Commercial Division cases but noted that because of the current language of Commercial Division Rule 3(a) – that “[a]t any stage of the matter, the court may direct or counsel may seek the appointment of an uncompensated mediator” (emphasis added) – the process of some court annexed mediation programs is for a mediator to be appointed from a roster instead of first giving the parties the opportunity to agree upon their neutral.  The proposal quoted the analysis by the former Co-Chairs of the New York State Bar Association’s Dispute Resolution Section’s Committee on ADR in the Court on the benefit of party-appointed mediators, which explained that historically, settlement rates from the EDNY (67%) and WDNY (72%) mediation programs, which afford the parties the initial opportunity to jointly choose their mediator, are significantly higher than in the New York County Commercial Division (34%) where mediators are selected for the parties by the ADR Coordinator.

 

The ADR Committee proposal would modify Rule 3(a) to include the following sentence: “Counsel are encouraged to work together to select a mediator that is mutually acceptable, and may wish to consult any list of approved neutrals in the county where the case is pending.”  The ADR Committee also pointed out that Nassau and Westchester County Commercial Divisions currently give parties five business days to attempt to agree on a mediator before the process of appointment reverts to the court and suggested that including such a time period in Rule 3(a) “would be optimal.”  Recognizing that there are local rules governing ADR administration, the ADR Committee further recommended that instead of proposing an immediate change to the Commercial Division Rules, OCA and the Statewide ADR Coordinator consult with the ADR Administrators in each Commercial Division location to determine whether their ADR Rules can be revised to include an initial five-day period for the parties to jointly select a mediator.

 

For those interested, the public comment period is open until August 20, 2018, and comments are to either be: emailed to rulescomments@nycourts.gov; or sent to John W. McConnel, Esq., Counsel, Office of Court Administration, 25 Beaver Street, 11th Fl., New York, New York 10004.