“Successor liability”, is it a theory or distinct claim or cause of action?
In a recent decision, Justice Sherwood analyze
d the applicability of successor liability as a distinct cause of action, rather than merely a theory of liability in New York. In Meyer v Blue Sky Alternative Investments LLC, plaintiff Meyer moved to amend
Proximate cause is a necessary element in tort law, but also applies to claims of breach of commercial contract. 
In a recent decision by Justice Barry R. Ostrager in MUFG Union Bank, N.A. v. Axos Bank et al., No. 652474/2019, 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 51101(U) (Sup. Ct., New York County Sept. 25, 2020), the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court, New York County addressed, among other things, the issue of whether a defendant’s breach was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s damages in denying one defendant’s motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.
The parties to the action are MUFG Union Bank, N.A. (“Union”), Epiq Systems, Inc. (“Epiq”), and Axos Bank, Axos Fiduciary Services, Axos Nevada, LLC, and Seller Sub, LLC (collectively, “Axos”).
On or about September 27, 2012, Union and Epiq entered into a Joint Services Agreement (“JSA”), effective October 1, 2012, as amended. Pursuant to the JSA, Union and Epiq agreed, among other things, “to jointly promote their products and services to bankruptcy and insolvency professionals and also fiduciary types as may be agreed upon by the parties on a case-by-case basis,” which professional and fiduciary types were deemed “Joint Clients”. Specifically, Union provided deposit services to bankruptcy trustee customers and Epiq provided software services to bankruptcy trustee customers. The JSA expressly restricted Union and Epiq’s ability to assign the JSA or transfer Joint Client relationships or accounts without the other’s prior written consent. Notwithstanding this restriction, Epiq, without consent of Union, decided to sell its software business to Axos. In order to circumvent the anti-assignment provision in the JSA, Epiq established Seller Sub, LLC (“Seller Sub”), identified as “a special purpose entity wholly owned by Epiq and allegedly created for the sole purpose of effectuating the transfer of the JSA to Axos without Union’s consent.” Epiq formed Seller Sub one day before entering into a fifh amendment of the JSA with Union. Epiq then transferred the JSA to Seller Sub. Axos then acquired Seller Sub with the JSA. But Epiq directly transferred its software business to Axos. Thereafter, Axos terminated the JSA with Union and the action ensued.
Continue Reading Proximate Cause In Breach Of Contract Actions: Is Loss A Foreseeable Consequence Of Circumstances Created By The Breaching Party?
I
n 2015, our colleagues in the white-collar criminal defense bar braced for the impact of a memorandum penned by then Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates. The Yates Memo encouraged both federal prosecutors and civil enforcement attorneys to make increased efforts to hold culpable individuals accountable for corporate misconduct.
The Yates Memo embodied the precept
A familiar fact pattern: ParentCo is the owner and controlling shareholder of SubCo. ParentCo completely controls SubCo. The two companies have the same officers, issue consolidated financial returns, and the profits and losses of SubCo are passed through to ParentCo. ParentCo deliberately keeps SubCo in a cash-starved and undercapitalized state, so SubCo is entirely dependent
Disputes over the scope of insurance coverage are common fixtures in the Commercial Division Courts. Earlier this month, the First Department partially affirmed Justice Sherwood’s decision in Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Schorsch et al. Considering a matter of first impression in the New York Commercial Division Courts, the decision holds that a D&O policy’s
It’s back to business as usual for Commercial Division Justice Andrew Borrok, who recently issued a slew of decisions contributing to New York’s robust Commercial Division jurisprudence. In one decision, Allergan Fin., LLC v Pfizer Inc. (2020 NY Slip Op 50422 [U] [Sup Ct, NY County Apr. 13, 2020]), Justice Borrok denied a motion
Winning at the blame game is difficult to do. This holds e
specially true where the “blame game” is actually a claim for legal malpractice.
In a recent decision, the First Department affirmed Justice Sherwood’s Orders, which granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint against them. In Binn v. Muchnick, Golieb & Golieb, P.C.,
Our parents taught us to think before we speak. That lesson is especially important when words or conduct could cost you hundreds of thousands of dollars beyond what was previously agreed upon in a subcontract agreement.
In a recent case before Justice Andrea Masley, Corporate Electrical Technologies, Inc. v. Structure Tone, Inc. et al.