In a recent case, Gammel v Immelt (2019 NY Slip Op 32005[U]), shareholders of General Electric Company (GE), brought a derivative shareholder action against the members of GE’s board of directors and various committees charged 
with overseeing GE’s business operations. Plaintiffs alleged causes of action sounding in gross mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty, among
Dismissed: The Tragic, True Story of Direct and Derivative Claims Jumbled Together Beyond Recognition
Much has been written about the pleading requirements unique to shareholder derivative lawsuits. For example, a derivative complaint must allege the plaintiff’s standing as a shareholder at all relevant times. Demand upon the board, or its futility, must also be pled with sufficient particularity. But fundamentally, a complaint may not assert direct claims derivatively,
Are There Heightened Pleading Requirements When Alleging Consequential Damages Against an Insurer in a Coverage Dispute? “No”, Says the First Department
Are “consequential damages” available on contract claim against an insurer in an action brought by an insured for breach of a commercial liability policy? In D.K. Prop., Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins., a recent case out of the First Department, the answer is a resounding “yes”. There, the complaint alleged two causes of
Insurers Must Defend Claims Brought By Hulk Hogan: Intentional Tort Deemed “Accidental” Occurrence
To welcome the New Year, we venture outside this blog’s traditional realm of commercial division practice and procedure to reflect on the nature of “intent” at the intersection of professional wrestling and insurer coverage liability. No, this is not a surrealist poem, but a recent decision by Justice Peter Sherwood of the Commercial Division for
Amended CPLR 503(a): “Extra Butter” Sneakerheads Must Defend Alleged Theft of Yeezys, and Other Fly Kicks, in New York County
It has been almost one year since the New York legislature amended CPLR 503(a) to provide for venue in “the county in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” Yet a recent decision by Commercial Division Justice Andrea Masley shows that some practitioners have either forgotten about
Is the Defense of “Release” Documentary Evidence Under 3211(a)(1) or an Affirmative Defense Under (a)(5)(or does it matter)?
In Miller v. Brunner, the Appellate Division, Second Department spoke clearly (again) about how to move to dismiss on the defense of release. In a case arising out of the Commercial Division in Kings County (Hon. Sylvia G. Ash), a question on appeal was whether the defense of release is considered “documentary
“Unnecessary and Inappropriate”: The declaration no one wanted
Your client wants to recover damages f
or breach of contract and demands that you assert as many causes of action as possible. In addition to the breach cause of action, you consider a declaratory judgment claim, right? Wrong! The Second Department has held time and time again that “[a] cause of action for a
Second Department Allows Untimely Claims to Relate Back to Action Brought By Wrong Plaintiff
Can substitution of a new plaintiff who has proper standing cause “surprise or prejudice” to a defendant after the statute of limitations would have expired, such that leave to file an amended complaint should be denied? Not if the two plaintiffs are the same person switching from their individual to representative capacity, held the Second
First Department Rejects Kesha’s Proposed Counterclaims Seeking to Terminate Contracts With Dr. Luke
In a recent decision handed down just a couple of days ago, the Appellate Division, First Department affirmed Justice Kornreich’s denial of singer and songwriter Kesha Sebert’s (“Kesha”) motion for leave to file second amended counterclaims, meaning Kesha will not be released from her recording contracts with producer Lukasz Gottwald, also known as Dr. Luke
Default Judgment Entered on a Promissory Note Even Though Claim Likely Violated Criminal Usury Laws
So a plaintiff obtains a default judgment against a defendant on a promissory note case. Defendant fails to appear or defend. On a motion to enter the default pursuant to CPLR 3215, one would assume that without opposition, judgment would be entered for the amount of the loans. Interestingly, t
hat’s not quite what happened