APPENDIX A: LEGISLATION REVIEWED

I. Assemblyman Clyde Vanel's proposed statutes on AI:

- *Evidence created or processed by artificial intelligence.* An Act to amend New York's Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) and Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) to address "the admissibility of evidence created or processed by artificial intelligence"

The essence of the evidence bill, which would amend the CPL and CPLR, is as follows:

§ 60.80 Rules of evidence; admissibility of evidence created or processed by artificial intelligence.

1. Evidence *created, in whole or in part, by artificial intelligence* shall not be received into evidence in a criminal proceeding unless the evidence is substantially supported by independent and admissible evidence and the proponent of the evidence establishes the reliability and accuracy of the specific use of the artificial intelligence in creating the evidence.

2. Evidence *processed, in whole or in part, by artificial intelligence* shall not be received into evidence in a criminal proceeding unless the proponent of the evidence establishes the reliability and accuracy of the specific use of the artificial intelligence in processing the evidence (emphasis added).

- *Political communications using artificial intelligence.* An Act to amend New York Election Law by requiring disclosure of "the use of artificial intelligence in political communications."

This bill would amend New York Election Law by requiring disclosure of "the use of artificial intelligence in political communications." The bill has separate sections to cover visual and non-visual communications. The heart of the bill provides as follows:

5. (a) Any political communication, regardless of whether such communication is considered a substantial or nominal expenditure, that uses *an image or video footage that was generated in whole or in part with the use of artificial intelligence*, as defined by the state board of elections, *shall be required to disclose that artificial intelligence was used* in such communication in accordance with paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of this subdivision (emphasis added).

Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) require specific disclaimers for "printed or digital political communications," "non-printed and non-digital political communications," and political communications that are "not visual, such as radio or automated telephone calls."

- *Political communications created by synthetic media.* An Act to amend New York Election Law, by "prohibiting the creation of synthetic media with intent to influence the outcome of an election."

  This bill would amend New York Election Law, by "prohibiting the creation of synthetic media with intent to influence the outcome of an election." Specifically, the bill would add a new § 17-172 that would provide as follows:

  § 17-172. Creating synthetic media with intent to unduly influence the 4 outcome of an election.

  1. A person who, with intent to injure a candidate or unduly influence the outcome of an election, creates or causes to be created a *fabricated photographic, videographic, or audio record* and causes such fabricated photographic, videographic, or audio record to be disseminated or published within sixty days of an election shall be guilty of a class E felony (emphasis added).

- *Artificial intelligence bill of rights.* An Act to amend New York's Technology Law by "enacting the New York artificial intelligence bill of rights."

  This bill would amend New York's Technology Law by "enacting the New York artificial intelligence bill of rights." The section on legislative intent says, in part:

  [T]he legislature declares that any New York resident affected by any *system making decisions without human intervention* be entitled to certain rights and protections to ensure that the system impacting their lives do so lawfully, properly, and with meaningful oversight.

  Among these rights and protections are (i) the right to safe and effective systems; (ii) protections against algorithmic discrimination; (iii) protections against abusive data practices; (iv) the right to have agency over one's data; (v) the right to know when an automated system is being used; (vi) the right to understand how and why an automated system contributed to outcomes that impact one; (vii) the right to opt out of an automated system; and (viii) the right to work with a human in the place of an automated system.

  The next part of the bill defines various terms. For example:

  4. "Algorithmic discrimination" means circumstances where an automated system contributes to an unjustified different treatment or impact which disfavors people based on their age, color, creed, disability, domestic violence victim status, gender identity or expression, familial status, marital status, military status, national origin, predisposing genetic characteristics, pregnancy-related condition, prior arrest or conviction record, race, sex, sexual orientation, or veteran status or any other classification protected by law.

The next part of the bill imposes various requirements. For example:

§ 404. Safe and effective systems.

2. *Automated systems shall undergo pre-deployment testing, risk identification and mitigation*, and shall also be subjected to ongoing monitoring that demonstrates they are safe and effective based on their intended use, mitigation of unsafe outcomes including those beyond the intended use, and adherence to domain-specific standards.

3. If an automated system fails to meet the requirements of this section, it shall not be deployed or, if already in use, shall be removed. *No automated system shall be designed with the intent or a reasonably foreseeable possibility of endangering the safety of any New York resident or New York communities* (emphasis added).

- *New York Penal Law – Fabricated photos, video, or audio*. An Act to amend the penal law by addressing "unlawful dissemination or publication of a fabricated photographic, videographic, or audio record."

This bill would amend New York's Penal Law by addressing "unlawful dissemination or publication of a fabricated photographic, videographic, or audio record." The essence of the bill is as follows:

1. A person is guilty of unlawful dissemination or publication of a fabricated photographic, videographic, or audio record when, with intent to cause harm to the liberty or emotional, social, financial or physical welfare of an identifiable person or persons, he or she intentionally creates or causes to be created a fabricated record of such person or persons and disseminates or publishes such record of such person or persons without such person or persons' consent.

The bill contains many exceptions. For example, the bill says:

This section shall not apply to the following:
(a) Dissemination or publication of a fabricated record by *a person who did not create the fabricated record*, whether or not such person is aware of the authenticity of the record;
(b) Dissemination or publication of a fabricated record that was created during the lawful and *common practices of law enforcement, legal proceedings or medical treatment* where the record is not disseminated or published with the intent to misrepresent its authenticity;
(c) Dissemination or publication of a fabricated record that was created for the purpose of *political or social commentary, parody, satire, or artistic expression* that is not disseminated or published with the intent to misrepresent its authenticity . . . (emphasis added)

- *Advanced Artificial Intelligence Licensing Act.* An Act to amend the state Technology Law to require registration and licensing of "high-risk advanced artificial intelligence systems."

An Act to amend the state Technology Law to address "advanced artificial intelligence systems" and to require registration and licensing of "high-risk advanced artificial intelligence systems." The bill defines these as follows:

1. "Advanced artificial intelligence system" shall mean any digital application or software, whether or not integrated with physical hardware, that *autonomously performs functions traditionally requiring human intelligence*. This includes, but is not limited to the system:

(a) Having the ability to learn from and adapt to new data or situations autonomously; or

(b) Having the ability to perform functions that require cognitive processes such as understanding, learning or decision-making for each specific task.

2. "High-risk advanced artificial intelligence system" shall mean any advanced artificial intelligence system that possesses *capabilities that can cause significant harm to the liberty, emotional, psychological, financial, physical, or privacy interests of an individual or groups of individuals, or which have significant implications on governance, infrastructure, or the environment*. The director shall assess any such public or private system in determining whether such system requires registration (emphasis added).

After a long series of definitions, the bill provides that the New York Department of State shall have "discretion to issue or refuse to issue any license provided for in this article" and to "revoke, cancel or suspend" any such license.

- *General Business Law – Oaths of responsible use of advanced AI*. An Act to amend New York's General Business Law by "requiring the collection of oaths of responsible use from users of certain high-impact advanced artificial intelligence systems."

This bill would amend New York's General Business Law by "requiring the collection of oaths of responsible use from users of certain high-impact advanced artificial intelligence systems." Here is a sample of the operative language of the oath:

I, _____ residing at _____, do affirm under penalty of perjury that I have not used, am not using, do not intend to use, and will not use the services provided by this advanced artificial intelligence system in a manner that violated or violates any of the following affirmations:

1. I will not use the platform to create or disseminate content that can foreseeably cause injury to another in violation of applicable laws;

2. I will not use the platform to aid, encourage, or in any way promote any form of illegal activity in violation of applicable laws;

3. I will not use the platform to disseminate content that is defamatory, offensive, harassing, violent, discriminatory, or otherwise harmful in violation of applicable laws;

4. I will not use the platform to create and disseminate content related to an individual, group of individuals, organization, or current, past, or future events that are of the public interest which I know to be false and which I intend to use for the purpose of misleading the public or causing panic."

II. Federal and New York State proposals regarding use of AI-generated or compiled information in judicial proceedings

Judges face challenges in evaluating the admissibility of AI-generated or compiled evidence. Concerns include the reliability, transparency, interpretability and bias in such evidence. These challenges become even more pronounced with the use of generative AI systems. A discussion follows regarding two recent proposals to address these challenges.

Federal Law – A proposal to amend Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9)

As a general matter, Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires the proponent of a given item of evidence to authenticate that evidence. That is, the proponent "must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is." Subsection (b) of that rule provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of how the proponent may satisfy the authentication requirement. As currently written, Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9), which applies to "evidence about a process or system" states that such evidence is "accurate" if the proponent shows that the process or system "produces an accurate result."

The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence is considering a proposal by former U.S. District Judge Paul Grimm and Dr. Maura R. Grossman of the University of Waterloo to amend Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9). That proposal initially changes the "accurate" standard as currently exists for any evidence about a process or system and replaces it with a requirement that

the proponent provide evidence that shows that the process or system produces a "reliable" result. For evidence generated by AI, the proponent must also (a) describe the software or program that was used and (b) show that it has produced reliable results in the proposed evidence.

New York: Proposed amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law and CPLR

New York State Assemblyman Clyde Vanel has introduced a bill, A 8110, which amends both the Criminal Procedure Law and the Civil Practice Law and Rules regarding the admissibility of evidence created or processed by artificial intelligence. As stated in the bill, evidence is "created" by AI when AI produces new information from existing information. Evidence is "processed" by AI when AI produces a conclusion based on existing information.

Simplified greatly, the bill requires that evidence "created" by AI would not be received at trial unless independent admissible evidence establishes the reliability and accuracy of the AI used to create the evidence. Evidence "processed" by AI similarly requires the proponent of the evidence to establish the reliability and accuracy of the AI used. This bill does not yet have a co-sponsor in the Assembly and does not have a sponsor in the Senate.

The goals of both the proposal to amend Fed. R. Evid. 901 and the Vanel bill are laudable. The "black box" problem of AI is of great concern to lawyers and judges and has significant due process concerns in the criminal justice area. These proposals thus attempt to address AI-generated "deepfakes" that could be passed off as authentic evidence. Nevertheless, given the intricacies and time involved in the legislative and rule-amending processes, it may well be that the common law at the trial court level provides at least an interim roadmap for how judges should consider these issues. Indeed, this approach was largely employed to develop the law regarding discovery and admissibility of social media evidence when those issues first took hold.

III. New York City's local law regarding use of AI in hiring and promotion

As of this writing, there are no statewide laws or regulations in New York regarding commercial use of AI. Notably, Governor Hochul vetoed a bill in November 2023 (A.4969), initially proposed by Assemblyman Vanel, that would have created a statewide commission to study AI. But it appears that Assemblyman Vanel, and perhaps many of his colleagues, are undeterred in their attempts to keep the conversation moving. One such attempt is a bill actually drafted by an AI program, and introduced by Vanel, that permits tenants in New York state to have the right to be able to request a copy of their lease. That bill, A.6896, is awaiting sponsorship in the New York State Senate.

New York City has, however, entered the regulatory space regarding AI-based hiring decisions. As of July 5, 2023, New York City's Automated Employment Decision Tool (AEDT) law, Local Law 144 of 2021, or "NYC 144," requires New York City employers who use AI and other machine-learning technology as part of their hiring process to annually audit their recruitment technology. NYC 144 defines AEDT as (1) any computational process, derived from machine learning, statistical modeling, data analytics or artificial intelligence, (2) that issues a simplified output, including a score, classification or recommendation, which is used to substantially assist or replace discretionary decision making for employment decisions that impact natural persons. A third party must perform these audits, and the audit results must be available on the company's website. The audit itself must check for biases, whether intentional or unintentional, that are built into these systems. Failure to comply could result in fines starting at $500, with a maximum penalty of $1,500 per instance.

At the outset, NYC 144's focus on "employment decisions" appears to cover only hiring and promotion. Conversely, it appears that decisions regarding compensation, termination, benefits, workforce monitoring and perhaps even performance evaluations are beyond the reach

of the law. Moreover, NYC 144 applies only to those who actually apply for a job. Thus, the statute does not apply to any AI-based tools that might identify potential candidates who ultimately do not apply for a position.

Due to the recency of the NYC 144's implementation, there is no data as of this writing to determine its effectiveness, including whether and when any third-party audits have actually taken place. Even to the extent such audits have taken place, questions may remain as to the standards used for such audits and the company's data that was used for the audits.

IV. The White House's October 30, 2023 Executive Order regarding AI

On October 30, 2023, President Biden issued an Executive Order setting forth various standards for AI safety and security. It is one of the lengthier Executive Orders in recent history on any topic. The Order charges various executive agencies to develop guidelines, propose regulations or compile reports that will shape the AI landscape. The highlights of the Order include:

a. Establishment of the AI Safety and Security Board, under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security, to address any threats posed by AI systems to infrastructure and cybersecurity.

b. Requiring the Department of Commerce to provide guidance for content authentication and watermarking to clearly label AI-generated content on government communications. In turn, federal agencies using AI-generated content are to highlight these authentication tools to assist recipients of government communications to know that these communications are authentic.

c. Federal agencies are to develop rules and guidelines to address algorithmic discrimination, both through training and technical assistance in areas including criminal justice, federal benefits and contracting programs, civil rights, and workplace equity, health and safety.

The question remains how these directives will be enforced. There is no requirement that any non-governmental entities involved in the creation or marketing of AI tools adhere to the directives that the various agencies will issue. Additionally, the Order does not provide, or even suggest, any recourse for individuals harmed by discriminatory AI systems. On these points (and perhaps many others), Congress may well have to provide guidance to federal agencies. Nevertheless, the Executive Order does provide a framework for both the government and the private sector to think about AI issues. It also invests the federal government, at least under the current administration, in AI security.

V. Summary of the EU AI Act

On December 9, 2023, the EU Parliament and Council negotiators reached a provisional agreement on the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (the "EU AI Act"). The agreed text will now proceed towards formal adoption by both the EU Parliament and Council to become EU law. While it is expected that the EU Parliament will adopt the EU AI Act, the law itself will not come into force for at least another two years after that vote.

As an overarching objective, the EU AI Act aims to ensure that fundamental rights, democracy, the rule of law and environmental sustainability are protected from high-risk AI, while boosting innovation and making the EU a leader in the field. The rules establish obligations for AI based on its potential risks and level of impact.

The following is a summary of the key aspects of the EU AI Act:

- General Regulatory Approach: The EU AI Act generally opts for a risk-based approach. Some applications are specifically prohibited (e.g., social scoring), some high-risk areas are strictly regulated (e.g., employment and worker management), and some areas of low risk are based on self-regulation. The EU AI Act strives to

mitigate harm in areas where using AI poses "unacceptable" risk to fundamental rights, such as health care, education, border surveillance and public services.

- Territorial Scope: The EU AI Act has extraterritorial scope. It applies to: (a) providers placing on the EU market AI systems, whether those providers are established within the EU or in a third country; (b) users of AI systems located within the EU; (c) providers and users of AI systems that are located in a third country, where the output produced by the system is used in the EU. In practice this is likely to mean significant regulatory impact for U.S.-based organizations. The majority of the GDPR fines levied to date have been on U.S.-owned organizations. This extraterritorial reach is likely to be a feature of the EU AI Act as well.
- Prohibited AI applications: Recognizing the potential threat to individuals' rights and democracy posed by certain applications of AI, the EU AI Act specifically prohibits the following applications:
    - biometric categorization systems that use sensitive characteristics (e.g., political, religious, philosophical beliefs, sexual orientation, race);
    - untargeted scraping of facial images from the internet or CCTV footage to create facial recognition databases;
    - emotion recognition in the workplace and educational institutions;
    - social scoring based on social behavior or personal characteristics;
    - AI systems that manipulate human behavior to circumvent their free will;
    - AI used to exploit the vulnerabilities of people due to their age, disability, social or economic situation.

- High-Risk AI Applications: The EU AI Act delineates the applications and activities designated as “high risk” and adopts certain requirements for their development, deployment and use. These uses are not prohibited but strictly regulated.
    - Categories of High-Risk AI Applications: Certain specific-use cases are designated as “high risk” irrespective of which industry or product the use case is deployed in, for instance, the use of AI in biometric identification systems, critical infrastructure, credit-worthiness evaluation, human resources contexts and law enforcement. In addition, this category includes the use of AI in relation to certain products, for example, machinery, radio equipment, medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices, as well as AI used in certain products in civil aviation (security) and automotive industries. AI systems used to influence the outcome of elections and voter behavior are also classified as high risk.
    - Requirements for High-Risk AI Applications: Pursuant to the EU AI Act, high-risk AI must comply with various requirements such as conformity assessments, post-market surveillance, data governance and quality measures, mandatory registration, incident reporting and fundamental rights impact assessments. For example, in respect of AI systems classified as high risk (due to their significant potential harm to health, safety, fundamental rights, environment, democracy and the rule of law), the EU AI Act provides for a mandatory fundamental rights impact assessment applicable to, among other areas, the insurance and banking sectors. In addition, individuals will have a right to launch complaints about AI systems and receive explanations about decisions based on high-risk AI systems

that impact their rights. AI providers must build in human oversight, incorporating human-machine interface tools to ensure systems can be effectively overseen by natural persons.

- Law Enforcement: Predictive policing may only be employed under strict rules, such as clear human assessment and objective facts, not deferring the decision of investigating an individual to an algorithm. The EU AI Act stipulates a range of safeguards and narrow exceptions for the use of biometric identification systems (RBI) in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement purposes, subject to prior judicial authorization and for strictly defined lists of crime. “Post-remote” RBI would be used strictly in the targeted search of a person convicted or suspected of having committed a serious crime. “Real-time” RBI would have to comply with strict conditions and its use would be limited in time and location, for the purposes of:
  - targeted searches of victims (abduction, trafficking, sexual exploitation),
  - prevention of a specific and present terrorist threat, or
  - the localization or identification of a person suspected of having committed one of the specific crimes mentioned in the EU AI Act (e.g., terrorism, trafficking, sexual exploitation, murder, kidnapping, rape, armed robbery, participation in a criminal organization, environmental crime).
- General-Purpose AI: In order to reflect the broad range of tasks that AI systems can accomplish and the rapid expansion of their capabilities, under the EU AI Act general-purpose AI (GPAI) systems, and the GPAI models they are based on, will need to adhere to certain transparency requirements. These include presenting

technical documentation, complying with EU copyright law and disseminating detailed summaries about the content used for training. GPAI is defined in the EU AI Act as "an AI system that can be used in and adapted to a wide range of applications for which it was not intentionally and specifically designed." In this regard, the legislative text does not seem to distinguish between foundation AI, generative AI or GPAI regulation based on use cases. However, with respect to high-impact GPAI models with systemic risk, the EU AI Act stipulates more stringent obligations. High-impact GPAI models (in essence, those that were trained using a total computing power above a certain threshold) will be subject to more onerous requirements due to the presumption that they carry systemic risk. If these models meet certain criteria, they will need to conduct model evaluations, assess and mitigate systemic risks, conduct adversarial testing, report to the European Commission on serious incidents, ensure cybersecurity and report on their energy efficiency.