Search results for: "remote depositions"

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Much ink has been spilled over the last couple of years, including here at New York Commercial Division Practice, on the topic of practicing law remotely in the COVID (and likely post-COVID) era.  As we all brace for the coming wave of Omicron, which may well be the fastest spreading virus in human history, let’s take a quick look at the newest ComDiv rule on the topic — Rule 37 Remote Depositions — which went into effect on December 15, 2021.

We’ve reported on the recent trend of remote depositions on at least three occasions over the last year or so, including the ComDiv Advisory Council’s September 2020 proposal for, and request for public comment on, the new rule.  As noted in the memo supporting the recommendation, in light of COVID, whereas “remote depositions were previously the exception, they are now the rule.”

But more than that, “[t]here is good reason . . . to encourage their continued use . . . after the pandemic is brought under control.”  Why?  Because, as we all have learned from experience over the last couple years, “remote depositions can be quicker, easier, less costly, and more efficient than in-person depositions.”

New ComDiv Rule 37 — which generally permits courts, “upon the consent of the parties or upon a motion showing good cause, [to] order oral depositions by remote electronic means — is accompanied at new Appendix G by a fulsome template stipulation setting forth a remote depo protocol that addresses common practical concerns regarding technology, security, private communications, and the use of exhibits.  Some key excerpts:

  • Administration of Remote Depo Services.  “An employee . . . of the [court reporting] service provider shall . . . be available at each remote deposition to record the deposition, troubleshoot any technological issues that may arise, and administer the virtual breakout rooms.”
  • Audio and Video Clarity.  “Each person attending a deposition shall be clearly visible to all other participants, their statements shall be audible to all participants, and they should each use best efforts to ensure their environment is free from noise and distractions.”
  • Communications During Questioning.  “Deponents shall shut off electronic devices . . . and shall refrain from all private communication during questioning on the record.”
  • Use of Virtual Breakout Rooms.  “Parties may use a breakout-room feature, which simulates a live breakout room through videoconference[, but c]onversations in the breakout rooms shall not be recorded . . . [and] shall be established by . . . and controlled by the [court reporting] service provider.”
  • Collaboration and Advance Troubleshooting.  “The parties agree to work collaboratively and in good faith with the court reporting [service provider] to assess each deponent’s technological abilities and to troubleshoot any issues at least 48 hours in advance of the deposition . . . [and] also agree to work collaboratively to address and troubleshoot technological issues  that arise during a deposition.”
  • Sufficient Technology.  “Counsel shall use best efforts to ensure that they have sufficient technology to participate in a [remote] deposition . . . [and] shall likewise use best efforts to ensure that the deponent has such sufficient technology.”

To be sure, given the ominosity of Omicron, the new ComDiv rule concerning remote depositions comes to us at an appropriate time.  But given the efficiencies associated with the practice that we all have discovered along the way, and with essential safeguards now in place at Appendix G, one can expect frequent and ongoing invocation of Rule 37 long after the infection curve has flattened.

 

In March 2020, the New York State Courts and attorneys’ offices all over the state shut down as part of the public’s broad effort to slow the spread of the Coronavirus, and the legal profession quickly transitioned to remote operations.  Remote team meetings, court appearances, arbitration hearings, networking events, and depositions were all borne from the necessity imposed by closed offices and social distancing.

Despite the sometimes steep learning curve associated with the remote conferencing technology and systems, remote proceedings became surprisingly effective.  Lawyers who once swore that there was nothing like being in the same room as their adversary found that, in many cases, the Zoom or Teams suite works just fine.  As a consequence, one need not look beyond the pages of this blog to see that for many, remote practices are here to stay.  Commercial Division Rule 1 now allows attorneys to request to appear remotely, saving client costs and avoiding the unnecessary risk of infection.  In February, we wrote about the Commercial Division Advisory Committee’s proposed rule authorizing and regulating the use of remote depositions.  The proposed rule has received favorable comment.

Continue Reading Even as Pandemic Wanes, Remote Depositions Remain the New Normal

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The legal industry has adapted rather quickly in order to minimize the pandemic’s impacts on the practice of litigation by enacting orders, rules, and practices to keep the wheels of justice turning.  This includes the now-widespread use of virtual platforms for appearances before the Court as well as conducting remote depositions as my colleagues blogged about at the outset of the pandemic.  Notably, some have adapted to the “new normal” of virtual practice, while others seem to still struggle as the world saw in the now-infamous “cat-man court appearance” video.  Have remote depositions become the “new norm”?  It appears that way, as U.S. Magistrate Judge Stewart D. Aaron aptly remarked back last June in Rouviere v. Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc. (S.D.N.Y.).  Indeed, some Judges have even provided templates or sample deposition protocol stipulations like this one by U.S. Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lehrburger or another by U.S. Magistrate Judge Sarah L. Cave.

Remote depositions are nothing new in New York state courts (see CPLR 3113(d); Rogovin v Rogovin, and Yu Hui Chen v Chen Li Zhi), as well as the federal courts (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4)).  The dramatic increase in use, comfort level, and apparent permanency is a direct result of the pandemic. Indeed, the vision of the Commercial Division Advisory Council (“CDAC”) is to ensure that the Commercial Division remains at the forefront of this trend.

In September 2020, the CDAC sought to adopt a new Commercial Division Rule that would expressly authorize and regulate the use of remote depositions (the “Remote Deposition Proposal”).  The Remote Deposition Proposal seeks to provide further guidance on what is considered undue hardship, a standardized remote deposition protocol form, the validity of an oath or affirmation administered during a remote deposition when the court reporter is not physically located where the witness is present, and protections for defending attorneys and their clients in the event of technical difficulties.  The Proposal went out for public comment in November 2020, which closed on January 19, 2021, and is still pending a final decision from Chief Administrative Judge Marks.

The Remote Deposition Proposal also points out the potential pitfalls to remote depositions including technical issues, security issues, exhibit sharing, and, of particular importance, private communications.  While certain private communications should be accommodated (e.g. – privilege discussions), virtual depositions do have the potential for increased abuse of other communications such as coaching and guiding the witness.  As the Remote Deposition Proposal notes and provides potential safeguards against, deponents may commit abuses by communicating via digital devices and any “chat” feature of the virtual platform, if available.

Despite the potential pitfalls, the CDAC is taking affirmative steps towards combatting the potential for abuse and capitalizing on the undeniable efficiencies of remote depositions. Pro se and indigent litigants can testify remotely without having to take off of work or find childcare.  Lawyers no longer need to bill clients for their travel time to and from a deposition, worry about traffic, or public transportation delays.  Even commencement and recess times can be greatly reduced.

In short, while some may still struggle to adapt to the new norm, and New York’s Commercial Division appears poised to find the efficient, silver-lining of the pandemic, don’t forget to dress for success (as a Florida Judge recently reminded), just as if the proceeding were in person. As for wearing shorts during a remote deposition?  Don’t do it, cautions the authors of a recent ABA article, as dressing professionally conveys “to the deponent of the seriousness of the proceeding.  In other words, dressing the part can lead to acting the part.”  Good, sound advice worth heeding!

The COVID-19 pandemic has had widespread impact on litigation, with some courts and most cases coming to a screeching halt.  Some courts have responded with Orders or rules (Massachusetts Sup. Jud. Ct. Order OE-144 [March 20, 2020]; Wisconsin S. Ct. Order [March 25, 2020]; Florida S. Ct., No. AOSC20-16 [March 18, 2020]), while others have not, leaving the practitioner to determine the logistics under existing procedural rules and whatever Executive or Administrative Orders are in place.

As of this writing, we thought it might be helpful to provide the landscape in the state and federal courts in New York, and the impact, if any, Governor Cuomo’s Executive Order 202.7 may have.  We also provide links to helpful resources as you near your first virtual deposition.  We intend to update this as the landscape changes.

New York Law on Remote Depositions

New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) 3113(b) mandates that an “officer” put the deponent under oath. The officer, or someone acting under the direction of the officer, must record the testimony.  Typically, a notary public or a stenographer serves the function of an officer who then records the testimony.

Pursuant to CPLR 3113(d), the officer administering the oath and transcribing the testimony must be physically present at the location where the deponent is testifying. Put simply, the statute does not permit the officer to be at a remote location and accessible by telephone. The rationale makes sense:  the officer who swears in the witness must have proof that the person before them is the actual witness.  SIgnifciantly, however, the statute allows the parties to stipulate otherwise (CPLR 3113[d]; In re Estate of Smith, 29 Misc 3d 832, 834 [Sur Ct 2010] [The court notes that “unless otherwise stipulated to by parties, the officer administering the oath shall be physically present at the place of the deposition”]). CPLR 3113(d), in part, states that “[u]nless otherwise stipulated to by the parties, the officer administering the oath shall be physically present at the place of the deposition and the additional costs of conducting the deposition by telephonic or other remote electronic means, such as telephone charges, shall be borne by the party requesting that the deposition be conducted by such means.”  In Washington v Montefiore Hospital et al., the Third Department held that because the court reporter who administered the oath was not present in the deponent’s office during his testimony, and rather, was present by telephone, the deposition was not conducted in accordance with CPLR 3113. However, there, the Court held that because there was no objection to the manner in which the oath was administered, thus preventing any correction of defect, the objection was waived (see Matter of Washington v Montefiore Hosp., 7 AD3d 945, 948 [3d Dept 2004]).

The rule further provides,that the testimony can be recorded by “stenographic or other means.” Indeed, CPLR 3113(d) permits the parties to “stipulate that a deposition be taken by telephone or other remote electronic means and that a party may participate electronically.” The stipulation must be agreed to by all the parties to a litigation and must detail 1) the method of recording; 2) the use of exhibits; and 3) who must and may be physically present.

Federal Law on Remote Depositions

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 30(b)(4), “the parties may stipulate – or the court may on motion order – that a deposition be taken by telephone or other remote means.” In other words, under federal law, the court can order that a deposition be taken by telephone or other remote electronic means even in the absence of an agreement between the parties (Fed R Civ P 30[b][4]). Rule 30(b)(3) further states that testimony may be recorded by “audio, audiovisual, or stenographic means” and that the party who notices the deposition bears the recording costs.  In addition, any party can arrange to have the deposition testimony transcribed.

The COVID-19 pandemic has even caused certain federal judges to temporarily supplement their individual rules to permit all depositions to be taken by remote means, including telephone and videoconference (see Judge Lewis J. Liman’s COVID-19 Emergency Individual Practices in Civil and Criminal Cases).  The rule also provides that “[f]or avoidance of doubt, a deposition will be deemed to have been conducted “before” an officer so long as that officer attends the deposition via the same remote means (e.g., telephone conference call or video conference) used to connect all other remote participants, and so long as all participants (including the officer) can clearly hear and be heard by all other participants” (see id.).

Rule 30(b)(5) states that, unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the “deposition must be conducted before an officer appointed or designated under FRCP 28 (Nowlin v Lusk, 2014 WL 298155, at *5 [WD NY Jan. 28, 2014]).  Under FRCP 28, the deposition must be taken before either: 1) an officer authorized by federal law or by the law in the place of examination to administer oaths; or 2) a person appointed by the court where the action is pending. Rule 28 defines “officer” as a “person appointed by the court under this rule or designated by the parties under Rule 29(a).”  Notably, under FRCP 29(a), the parties can stipulate that “a deposition may be taken before any person, at any time or place, on any notice, and in the manner specified – in which event it may be used in the same way as any other deposition.” Put simply, the parties can stipulate that remote video depositions will be conducted by a person who is not a notary. The stipulation can also address the remote participation of the officer. The Rule does not require the parties to obtain the court’s approval of these stipulations. However, it is important to note that local rules can require approval for these stipulations.  Therefore, it is critical to consult both the Local Rules of the operative District Court, and the Individual Rules of the assigned Magistrate and Article III Judge.

Although the parties can stipulate otherwise, federal courts have held that a deposition is deemed to have been conducted before an officer if that officer “attends the deposition via the same remote means (e.g., telephone conference call or video conference) used to connect all other remote parties, and so long as all participants (including the officer) can clearly hear and be heard by all other participants)” (see Sinceno v Riverside Church in City of New York, 2020 WL 1302053, at *1 [SD NY Mar. 18, 2020] [permitting all depositions to be taken by telephone, video conference, or other remote means in light of the COVID-19 pandemic]).

In sum, federal law, unlike New York State law, does not require the physical presence of the officer in the same location as the deponent.

Executive Order 202.7 and Depositions

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, on March 19, 2020, Governor Cuomo issued Executive Order 202.7 (“EO”), which suspended until April 18, 2020 the rule requiring the physical appearance of a notary public for the signing of documents.  To date, it is unclear whether the suspension will be extended. It is also not clear what impact, if any, the EO has on CPLR 3113’s physical presence requirement.  The EO addresses the witnessing of document signings, not the administration of oaths at depositions. Specifically, Executive Order 202.7 permits notary services to be performed by video provided the following conditions are met:

  • The person seeking the Notary’s services, if not personally known to the Notary, must present valid photo ID to the Notary during the video conference, not merely transmit it prior to or after;
  • The video conference must allow for direct interaction between the person seeking the Notary’s services and the Notary (g., no pre-recorded videos of the person signing);
  • The person seeking the Notary’s services must affirmatively represent that he or she is physically situated in the State of New York;
  • The person seeking the Notary’s services must transmit by fax or electronic means a legible copy of the signed document directly to the Notary on the same date it was signed;
  • The Notary may notarize the transmitted copy of the document and transmit the same back to the person seeking the Notary’s services; and
  • The Notary may repeat the notarization of the original signed document as of the date of execution provided the Notary receives such original signed document together with the electronically notarized copy within thirty days after the date of execution.

The New York Department of State has issued guidance to notaries regarding Executive Order 202.7.  Below are the additional considerations for notaries:

  • Notaries public using audio-video technology must continue to follow existing requirements for notarizations that were unaltered by the Executive Order. This includes, but is not limited to, placing the notary’s expiration date and county where the notary is commissioned upon the document.
  • If the notary and signatory are in different counties, the notary should indicate on the document the county where each person is located.
  • An electronically transmitted document sent to the notary can be sent in any electronic format (e.g., PDF, JPEG, TIFF), provided it is a legible copy.
  • The notary must print and sign the document, in ink, and may not use an electronic signature to officiate the document.
  • The signatory may use an electronic signature, provided the document can be signed electronically under the Electronic Signatures and Records Act (Article 3 of the State Technology Law). If the signer uses an electronic signature, the notary must witness the electronic signature being applied to the document, as required under Executive Order 202.7.
  • The Executive Order does not authorize other officials to administer oaths or to take acknowledgments, and only applies to notary publics commissioned by the Secretary of State’s office.
  • Following remote notarization, if the notary receives the original document within 30 days, the notary may notarize the document again (i.e., physically affixing a notary stamp and hand signing the document) using the original remote notary date.
  • Additionally, when performing remote notarization pursuant to this Executive Order, the Department recommends the following best practices. (However, not following these two recommendations will not invalidate the act or be cause for discipline):
    • Keep a notary log of each remote notarization;
    • Indicate on the document that the notarization was made pursuant to Executive Order 202.7.

Some Helpful Links and Advice From Court Reporters

So what are court reporters doing in light of the pandemic?  Adapting of course!  Many are offering free virtual or on-line demonstrations of how to conduct a remote deposition, or helpful  information on how the depositions would proceed.  Some examples can be found at Enright, Veritext or Bee Reporting, to name a few.  You might want to share these “tutorials” with your witness or clients so they understand the process before “taking the stand”.

 

 

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Štefan Štefančík, Unsplash

The COVID-19 pandemic has unsurprisingly resulted in many people in the business community, including lawyers, transacting business remotely. With that uptick comes more contracts utilizing electronic signatures and remote depositions and notarizations. Not only is the use of an e-signature generally more convenient for the parties involved in a transaction, but an e-sig provides many more layers of security and protection from claims of forgery than a wet-signature because the process requires the user to confirm her identity to bind her signature to that identity through a digital certificate.

So what happens when there’s a contractual dispute, and one of the parties is seeking to enforce a contract while the counterparty is claiming that its electronic signature has been forged? On October 26, 2023, Justice Daniel J. Doyle of the Monroe County Commercial Division dealt with just that in  AJ Equity Group LLC v Office Connection, Inc., in which he held that the defendant’s mere denial that she e-signed an agreement was not sufficient to dismiss a breach of contract claim, but also that the plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment on its breach claim for failure to explain the relevance and significance of the signature certificate showing that the electronic signature was valid.

Background

In March of this year, the plaintiff filed an action predicated on the defendant-seller’s purported breach of a Receivable Purchase Agreement (“Agreement”). Karen Minc (“Ms. Minc”) purportedly signed the Agreement on behalf of defendant-seller, and simultaneously executed a guarantee (“Guarantee”), by which she guaranteed the prompt and complete performance of defendant-seller’s obligations to the plaintiff. In both the Agreement and the Guarantee, Ms. Minc, a Michigan resident, consented to personal jurisdiction in New York and to service of process by mail. Just two months later, defendant-seller purportedly defaulted under the Agreement, and Ms. Minc purportedly defaulted under the Guarantee.

The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant-seller and Ms. Minc. In Ms. Minc’s Answer, she claimed that she did not enter into the Agreement or Guarantee and denied that her signature appeared anywhere on the documents. She also asserted affirmative defenses for lack of personal jurisdiction, as well as invalid and insufficient service of process.

Motion Practice and the Court’s Decision

Shortly after Ms. Minc filed her Answer, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on its causes of action against the defendant-seller for breach of the Agreement and against Ms. Minc for breach of the Guarantee. Six days later, Ms. Minc filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint.

The Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff as against the defendant-seller on the breach of contract claim because the plaintiff submitted an affidavit attaching the Agreement and remittance history, as well as a sworn statement verifying the defendant-seller’s default. 

With respect to Ms. Minc’s motion to dismiss, the essence of her argument was that she did not sign the Agreement, and as such, she did not consent to New York subject matter jurisdiction (as the Agreement’s terms stated New York law would apply), or personal jurisdiction (the Agreement allowed service of process by regular mail). The motion to dismiss was solely supported by a barebones affidavit in which Ms. Minc denied that she signed the Agreement and the Guarantee and that the signature on the documents was not hers.

In opposition, the plaintiff submitted a memorandum of law in which it pointed to an “e-signature” with a “signature certificate” on the documents that it claimed unequivocally showed that a “Karen Minc” at an IP address located in Michigan consented to an e-signature through her email address.  

While this appeared to be sufficient evidence that Ms. Minc actually signed the Guarantee, much to the plaintiff’s chagrin, the Court held that the mere existence of the e-signature coupled with the signature certificate was not by itself enough to establish the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether the Guarantee was signed by Ms. Minc. The Court thus denied summary judgment on breach of the Guarantee claim, holding in pertinent part:

“Although generally a bald allegation of forgery is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, in this case Ms. Minc’s denial of signature coupled with the plaintiff’s failure to submit evidence, or even explain, relative to the e-signature certificate creates an issue of fact necessitating denial of the motion. Although e-signatures are considered valid in New York, the plaintiff’s failure to explain the “signature certificate” prevents this Court from determining whether the procedures used complied with either the New York Electronic Signatures and Records Act (ERSA) (NY State Tech § 301 et seq.) or are sufficient for the Court to determine that defendant Karen Minc intended to be bound by the agreement.”

The Court also denied Ms. Minc’s motion to dismiss finding that she did not meet her burden for dismissal based on “documentary evidence” under CPLR 3211(a)(1). While Ms. Minc provided an affidavit in which she denied that it was her signature on the documents, the Court stated “[n]either affidavits, deposition testimony, nor letters are considered documentary evidence within the intendment of CPLR 3211(a)(1)” because they are not unambiguous and thus cannot conclusively dispose of a plaintiff’s claim.

The Court also stated that it did not need to reach the jurisdictional and choice of law provisions raised in the motion to dismiss insofar as those arguments were “necessarily dependent” on whether Ms. Minc signed the agreement, and her affidavit was insufficient documentary evidence to establish that on a motion to dismiss.

Takeaway

The problem with the parties’ submissions on their motions in the AJ Equity Group case was the evidence, or lack thereof.

On the one hand, to obtain summary judgment it is necessary that the movant establish its cause of action or defense “sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment” in its favor (see CPLR 3212 [b]), and do so by tender of evidentiary proof in admissible form. Although the existence of the electronic signature and certificate should have been a slam dunk for the plaintiff, it failed to substantiate their relevance by proof in admissible form.

On the other hand, the defendant’s unsubstantiated sworn denial of signing the Agreement and Guarantee was not enough to warrant dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(1) based on “documentary evidence.” The careful practitioner should be aware of the limits of this ground for dismissal before attempting to rely solely on an affidavit as to its proof.

It is no secret by now that remote proceedings are here to stay. Driven at first by the safety protocols related to the COVID-19 pandemic, remote proceedings have outlived those protocols, and they remain the preferred forum for many parties and Justices.  The recent pages of this blog are filled with caselaw and proposed rule changes underscoring the reality that virtual proceedings will remain an integral part of the practice of law for the foreseeable future (see this post regarding Commercial Division Rule 1 and requests to appear remotely, or this post concerning remote depositions).

On September 23, 2022, the Office of Court Administration sought public comment on a proposal by the Commercial Division Advisory Council (“CADC”) to amend Commercial Division Rule 36 to expressly authorize courts to order virtual evidentiary hearings and bench trials without the consent of the parties, upon a finding of good cause.

Rule 36, titled: Virtual Evidentiary Hearing or Non-jury Trial, currently provides that, if there is appropriate videoconferencing technology, the court “may, with the consent of the parties, conduct an evidentiary hearing or a non-jury trial utilizing video technology.”  The proposed amendment would clarify that the court may “with the consent of the parties, or upon a motion showing good cause, or upon the court’s own motion, conduct an evidentiary hearing or non-jury trial utilizing video technology.” 

This proposed change follows a similar change to Commercial Division Rule 37.  As discussed in this post, new Commercial Division Rule 37 provides that the courts may “upon the consent of the parties or upon a motion showing good cause, order oral depositions by remote electronic means.”  If the court can order that depositions can be remote, why can’t it order the same for evidentiary hearings and bench trials? 

The CDAC notes that the proposed amendment simply clarifies the authority that the courts already have.  Relying mostly on Judiciary law § 2-b(3), which empowers courts with the authority to “devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by it,” several courts have concluded that even without amendment to the Commercial Division Rules, courts have the authority to order remote proceedings over the objection of a party (see, e.g., Quattro Parent LLC v Rakib, 2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 30190[U], 3 [NY Sup Ct, NY Co 2022] [Masley, J.]; Wyona Apartments LLC v Ramirez, 70 Misc 3d 591 [Civ Ct, Kings Co 2020]).

The more interesting portion of the proposal lies in the CADC’s proposed addition of subsection (d), which provides:

In connection with any opposed motion [to proceed with a virtual hearing or non-jury trial], the Court shall determine the existence of “good cause” by considering at least the following factors:

(1) the overall efficiency of conducting a virtual proceeding, including but not limited to consideration of the convenience to all parties involved, the time and costs of travel by counsel, litigants, and witnesses to the location of the trial or hearing, and avoiding undue delay in case management and resolution;

(2) the safety of the parties, counsel, and the witnesses, including whether counsel, the litigants, and the witnesses may safely convene in one location for the trial or hearing; and

(3) Prejudice to the parties.

Enumerating these factors in Rule 36, the CADC reasons, “will allow the Commercial Division to increase efficiency and to reduce unnecessary litigation.” 

These factors seem to favor remote proceedings.  Courts have already held that virtual proceedings do not prejudice a party (see A.S. v N.S., 68 Misc 3d 767, 768 [Sup Ct, NY Co 2020]), so factor (3) is a non-factor in all but exceptional circumstances.  And it is difficult to imagine a circumstance where factor (1) or (2) would counsel in favor of an in-person hearing; remote proceedings will always entail less travel time and costs and greater “safety.”  If courts cabin their consideration to the factors proposed by the CDAC, we will see a lot more virtual proceedings.

The proposed rule also permits courts to consider other factors. Depending on the circumstances, the security of the proceedings and risk of unauthorized electronic access, the risk that a witness may get off-camera coaching during their testimony, and the effective presentation of evidence (particularly non-documentary evidence) might all weigh into the Court’s analysis. 

Comments to the proposal are due by November 23, 2022, by email to rulecomments@nycourts.gov.  In the meantime, counsel should keep their video-cameras and Zoom-suits handy.

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As frequent readers of this blog are no doubt aware, the ten-volume practice treatise entitled Commercial Litigation in New York State Courts and edited by distinguished commercial practitioner Robert L. Haig (the “Haig Treatise”) – now in its 5th edition – is an invaluable guide for litigators navigating the inner workings of the New York State Court system.  With contributions by over 250 authors, the Haig Treatise is a must-have in every commercial litigator’s library, as it is chock-full with insights, strategies, and tactics essential to litigators and corporate in-house counsel alike.  With over 150 chapters, the Haig Treatise is a one-stop destination providing guidance on virtually every topic, procedural or substantive, that may arise in your commercial-litigation practice.

It’s no surprise that the Haig Treatise devotes an entire chapter to the topic of practicing before New York’s Commercial Division.  After all, Mr. Haig chairs the Commercial Division Advisory Council, whose primary purpose is to advise the Chief Judge of the State of New York on all matters related to the Commercial Division, and is one of the leading advocates for the Commercial Division as being among the premier business courts in the country – nay, the world.   

Chapter 39 of the Haig Treatise, entitled “Practice Before the Commercial Division,” is of particular interest to us here at New York Commercial Division Practice for obvious reasons.  Authored by the Hon. Brian M. Cogan of the EDNY and co-managing partner Alan M. Klinger of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, the chapter provides an all-fours summary for those who may be less familiar with practicing in the Commercial Division – including but not limited to issues related to eligibility for assignment, unique discovery rules, motion practice, ADR requirements, and confidentiality – much of which has served as blog fodder for us over the years.

But the Haig Treatise’s chapter on the Commercial Division also offers some unique practice insights worth expanding on here.  For example, the chapter spends a fair amount of time on the subject of forum shopping – particularly from the perspective of weighing the advantages and disadvantages of litigating in the Commercial Division as opposed to federal court, which for many years enjoyed preferential status among commercial litigators in the New York metro area. 

It’s common knowledge, of course, that plaintiffs’ counsel angle to commence suit in the forum expected to be most favorable to their clients.  Likewise, defendants’ counsel often take the opportunity to remove or transfer a case to a forum more favorable to their own clients.  On this, the authors of the ComDiv chapter suggest that the Commercial Division has “leveled the playing field” in the forum-selection game, and they provide invaluable strategic considerations for litigators when making this choice.

To be sure, since its inception in the mid-1990s, the Commercial Division has become a more attractive setting for business litigation in New York.  In fact, it has for many become the preferred forum for litigating complex business disputes.  The ComDiv chapter authors explain that one of the primary reasons for this is because of the expertise and sophistication of the ComDiv judges on all matters commercial.  As the preamble to the ComDiv Rules suggests, “the [Commercial] Division’s judges are chosen for their extensive experience in resolving sophisticated commercial disputes. Unlike jurists in other civil parts in New York’s court system, Commercial Division justices devote themselves almost exclusively to these complex commercial matters.”  This constitutes a legitimate counterpoint to a common argument in favor of litigating commercial disputes in federal court due to the business-law expertise of many of its judges, who often are appointed to the bench after having spent years litigating complex commercial matters at major law firms.

Another consideration weighing in favor of choosing to litigate before the Commercial Division as opposed to federal court is the comfort of knowing that, once commenced or transferred, your case will be heard by one of a select number of judges.  For example, for those looking to litigate in Manhattan, there are eight Commercial Division judges to whom your case could be assigned versus the approximately 50 SDNY district and magistrate judges sitting on Pearl Street or Foley Square.  Likewise, if you’re looking to litigate in or around Westchester County, you can be certain that your case will be assigned to one or the other of Commercial Division Justices Linda Jamieson or Gretchen Walsh versus the approximately 10 SDNY district and magistrate judges sitting on Quarropas Street in White Plains.

By the way, if you find yourself persuaded by the ComDiv chapter authors on this topic, Appendix C of the ComDiv Rules makes available sample forum-selection clauses, the express purpose of which “is to offer contracting parties streamlined, convenient tools in expressing their consent to confer jurisdiction on the Commercial Division.”

The authors of the ComDiv chapter also make a point of extolling the technological virtues of practicing before the Commercial Division – including, for example, the introduction of the next-gen “Courtroom for the New Millennium” and other innovative developments toward remote or virtual court participation.  

In 2004, long before the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Court in New York County initiated a pilot program entitled “CourtCall,” which permitted attorneys to participate in certain court conferences telephonically.  Despite its obvious benefits – e.g., efficiency, expediency, cost-savings, etc. – the program didn’t gain much traction in the non-commercial parts.  The same can’t be said for the Commercial Division however.  As noted by the ComDiv chapter’s authors, “one legacy of the program [wa]s that the Commercial Division appear[ed] to have a greater degree of receptivity to the use of teleconferencing than in the non-commercial parts.”  

Such appearances no doubt have become realities over the last couple of years, as the Commercial Division has been compelled by the circumstances presented by COVID to make a massive pivot toward remote or virtual participation as a “new norm” for commercial litigation in New York – including, for example, new or amended rules on remote depositions, remote appearances, and virtual evidentiary hearings.   

As with many chapters in the Haig Treatise, the ComDiv chapter closes with some helpful practice aids, checklists, and forms – in this case specifically geared toward practicing in the Commercial Division – including ComDiv assignment and preliminary-conference forms, confidentiality stipulations, and much more.

In sum, chapter 39 of the Haig Treatise on practicing before the Commercial Division – as with the Treatise as a whole – is a well-organized, straightforward, and practical tool that all New York commercial litigators should have on their shelves.  

As we all are acutely aware, during the last 21+ months, the normally slow-to-change practice of law has been thrust into overdrive, forcing lawyers and courts to quickly pivot from a largely in-person practice to virtual.

New York courts in particular have done an incredible job expanding access to litigants online by, among other things, expanding e-filing capabilities, conducting virtual appearances for conferences and oral arguments, encouraging remote depositions, and even conducting trials online. I’ve discussed with colleagues and adversaries alike the newfound efficiencies that have emerged out of the necessity caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

New York’s Commercial Division, ever the agent of progress, keeps a good thing going with respect to virtual access. Just last week, on October 19, 2021, Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks promulgated new Commercial Division Rule 36 (Administrative Order 299/2021), which will allow Commercial Division judges to conduct virtual evidentiary hearings and non-jury trials on consent of the parties.

In a memo published by the Commercial Division Advisory Council last June 2020, the Advisory Council advocated for this new rule (adopted in large part by AO/299/21). Among the benefits cited are the cost and time savings that virtual conference technology would bring. A global business hub, New York is the venue of choice for much commercial litigation around the country and around the world. Rule 36 will remove many of the obstacles in coordinating party, witness, lawyer, and court scheduling by largely reducing or eliminating the time and cost of necessary travel.

The public’s collective comfort with using video conferencing technology has only increased since the Advisory Council’s June 2020 memo. Having already incorporated such technologies into many other facets of the legal practice (i.e. “Zoom meetings”, remote depositions, etc.), expanding its use to evidentiary hearings and bench trials is not much of a stretch. Video conferencing technologies have only improved in efficiency and security after months of rapid development necessitated by stay-at-home orders, travel bans, and quarantine mandates from earlier in the pandemic (some of which still apply in certain jurisdictions).

It is important to note that Rule 36 requires the consent of all parties. Additionally, the Rule is permissive, not mandatory, meaning that even if all parties consent, ultimately the availability of virtual evidentiary hearings and non-jury trials lies within the Court’s discretion. This flexibility allows for the tailored application of video conferencing technologies to evidentiary hearings and/or bench trials where a virtual appearance would be appropriate.

Given the technological developments in this area over the past 21+ months, and given the encouragement by the judiciary, cost-savings to the client, and overall efficiencies promoted, I have no doubt that Rule 36 will be a welcome addition to practitioners who find themselves regularly practicing in the Commercial Division.

So, without further ado, we give you Commercial Division Rule 36:

Rule 36. Virtual Evidentiary Hearing or Non-jury Trial.

(a)        If the requirements of paragraph (c) of this Rule are met, the court may, with the consent of the parties, conduct an evidentiary hearing or a non-jury trial utilizing video technology.

(b)       If the requirements of paragraph (c) of this Rule are met, the court may, with the consent of the parties, permit a witness or party to participate in an evidentiary hearing or a non-jury trial utilizing video technology.

(c)        The video technology used must enable:

(i)        a party and the party’s counsel to communicate confidentially;

(ii)       documents, photos and other things that are delivered to the court to be delivered to the remote participants;

(iii)      interpretation for a person of limited English proficiency;

(iv)      a verbatim record of the trial; and

(v)       public access to remote proceedings.

(d)      This Rule does not address the issue of when all parties do not consent.

Rule 36 becomes effective as of December 13, 2021.