A confession of judgment has often been viewed as an important tool in settling a litigation or finalizing a transaction.  In 2019, the New York State Legislature made some significant amendments to the Confession of Judgment law (CPLR § 3218), particularly eliminating the ability of creditors to file confessions of judgment against non-New York residents.  As a result, the amended CPLR § 3218 provides that the confession must state the county in which “the defendant resided when it was executed,” and that the confession may only be filed in that county or, if the defendant moved to a different county within New York after signing the confession, “where the defendant resided at the time of filing.”  In a recent decision, Kings County Commercial Division Justice Leon Ruchelsman  addressed the damaging consequences of altering a confession of judgment to meet the “residency” requirements of CPLR § 3218.

Background

In Porges v Kleinman, plaintiff commenced an action stemming from a real estate investment opportunity in New Jersey.  Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant pressured plaintiff to obtain a high cost loan to finance the purchase of the property while not allowing plaintiff to conduct any due diligence.  Following the closing, plaintiff alleged that defendant pressured him into signing a promissory note and confession of judgment for $675,000.00.  Approximately a year after the closing, defendant commenced a separate action, which was later consolidated with the present action, to enforce the confession of judgment due to plaintiff’s alleged failure to make any payments towards the promissory note.

During the course of the litigation, plaintiff brought a motion to vacate the confession of judgment, arguing that the confession of judgment (i) did not specify the county in which plaintiff resided; and (ii) was altered by striking out “County of New York” and writing in “County of Kings” in the caption.  In opposition, defendant argued that the alteration of the caption was made at the express instruction of the Kings County Clerk’s office to allow for the confession of judgment to be filed in the appropriate venue.Continue Reading Altering a Confession of Judgment? Think Again!

A recent decision from Justice Fidel Gomez of the Bronx County Commercial Division, 1125 Morris Ave. Realty LLC v Title Issues Agency LLC, reminds us to closely review the language of general releases as New York courts continue to enforce such releases however broad in scope absent any fraud or wrongful conduct. Failure to do so may not only result in the waiver of certain future claims but also the imposition of sanctions.

Background

Plaintiff 1125 Morris Ave. Realty LLC (“Plaintiff”) obtained a mortgage loan (“2014 Mortgage”) on a property located at 1125 Morris Avenue, Bronx, New York (the “Property”). Defendants Kofman and Lowenthal represented the lender in the transaction. Kofman and Lowenthal transferred the loan proceeds to Defendant Title Company (the “Title Company”) to hold such proceeds in escrow until certain taxes and water/sewer charges for the Property had been settled with the City. Plaintiff thereafter obtained additional mortgages in order to pay off the 2014 Mortgage.

Following the payoff and satisfaction of the 2014 Mortgage, in July 2016 Plaintiff executed a broad general release discharging Defendants Kofman and Lowenthal as well as the Title Company (collectively the “Defendants”) from all “claims and demands whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of this RELEASE.”

Plaintiff commenced an action against Defendants alleging, among other things, that Defendants committed fraud by failing to pay Plaintiff’s outstanding tax, water, and sewer charges for the Property, despite assuring Plaintiff that the loan proceeds would be used to satisfy the liens on the Property. Plaintiff further alleged that the Title Company only partially paid out the liens, and that only a portion of the loan proceeds were returned to Plaintiff.Continue Reading No Deceit, No Defeat: Commercial Division Enforces Broad General Release

In Castle Restoration & Constr., Inc. v Castle Restoration, LLC, Suffolk County Commercial Division Justice Elizabeth H. Emerson refused to enforce an oral agreement that allegedly modified a prior written agreement between the parties. In this blog post, we see how the Court applied a variety of contractual principals to determine the validity of

Nobody likes fraud claims asserted against them. Thankfully for defendants, fraud claims are notoriously difficult to prove, and defendants often try to have these claims dismissed at the pleading stage.

An express disclaimer in a contract is often a popular avenue for litigants facing a fraud claim to move for dismissal. A recent Commercial Division

“Relevant statements made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings are afforded absolute protection so that those discharging a public function may speak freely to zealously represent their clients without fear of reprisal or financial hazard.”

Professionals, including attorneys, and individuals may find themselves subject to a defamation lawsuit. Attorneys, however, may sometimes rely on absolute or

Earlier this year, my colleague, Madeline Greenblatt, wrote about the emergence of a new body of case law emanating from the myriad effects the COVID-19 pandemic has had on the real estate industry.  In her blog, Madeline discussed a recent decision from the Manhattan Commercial Division (Borrok, J.), rejecting a commercial tenant’s argument

A cause of action accrues, triggering the commencement of the statute of limitations period, when “all of the factual circumstances necessary to establish a right of action have occurred, so that the plaintiff would be entitled to relief” (Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.).  The “continuing wrong” doctrine is an exception

The statutes of limitations set forth in the CPLR are default rules, and parties generally are free to modify default rules by agreement.  But statutes of limitations also further the important public interests, such as avoiding stale claims and giving repose to our affairs.  In light of the public interests involved, there are substantial limits on how much parties can agree to lengthen, shorten, or waive the limitations periods applicable to claims arising under New York law.

For example, while parties can agree to a shorter limitations period than prescribed by the CPLR, a recent case by Albany County Commercial Division Justice Richard Platkin serves as a sharp reminder that a contractually shortened limitations period must be reasonable under the circumstances and, in many cases, the reasonableness of such an agreement depends not only on the length of the limitations period itself, but also on the accrual date.Continue Reading Expect Careful Scrutiny of Contractually Shortened Statutes of Limitations